

GRETCHEN ELSTON

***A SURVEY OF
THE JAPAN
COMMUNIST PARTY***

By J. P. NAPIER

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KYO BUN KWAN

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By J. P. Napier

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A SURVEY OF THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY

I. INTRODUCTION

In prewar years the Communist Party, banned by the Peace Preservation Laws and Imperial Ordinances, existed only as an underground association working principally among the intelligentsia. Whenever by overt activity it attracted the attention of the authorities it was promptly suppressed and driven back underground. Throughout the Pacific War the party lay dormant, its leaders in jail or scattered in exile. When freedom of political organization and activity was bestowed upon the Japanese by the Allied Occupation, communism achieved legal status on a basis of equality with other political ideologies.

In the immediate postwar period the Communist movement experienced a surge of power fostered by effective party organization and militant leadership and aided by the political vacuum then existing. For a brief time it appeared that the Communist Party might rise to power in Japan through legal political means. This potentiality failed of realization, however, due to a combination of factors, chiefly the inherent nature of the movement and the revulsion of the Japanese people against its tactic of violent action under foreign direction.

The present norm of direct popular support of Communist candidates is but 5% of the electorate. Communist front organizations are losing their influence as they are identified by the people. Labor, important segments of which at first came under Communist control, has ejected Communist leaders from all key positions. Japanese courts, reflecting public opinion, have sanctioned the discharge of Communist agitators from sensitive positions. Even the prisoners of war formerly held in Communist-dominated areas for thorough party indoctrination have on repatriation broken away from the movement. Party finances are at a low ebb.

By order of the Occupation, Communist publications guilty of repeated violations of the Press Code have been suspended. The party itself is so discredited in the eyes of the public and so weakened by internal schism that it is unlikely to show any material increase in strength in the foreseeable future. How this situation came about is the subject of the present report.

II. BACKGROUND AND FORMATION

Beginnings

There was no organized peoples' movement in Japan from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the termination of the Sino-Japanese War. Feudalistic concepts prevailed. There was no labor movement. Japan's first strike occurred in 1896, and then only as a relatively minor railroad stoppage north of Tokyo. However, the government was pushing an accelerated industrial revolution and accordingly, as industrial laborers increased in number, labor organizers began to work among them. Among those first to advocate peoples' action comparable to that contemplated by communism were KOTOKU Shusui, later executed together with his wife for plotting against the life of the emperor, and SAKAI Toshihiko. Also active were OSUGI Sakae and KONDO Eizo, responsible in November of 1904 for the translation of the Marx-Engel's Communist Manifesto and for its publication in the Heimin Shimbun.

This publication marked the beginning of communism in Japan—but the end of the Heimin Shimbun, which was immediately closed for having published the Proclamation in violation of the police regulations for public peace.

KONDO's group, too, fomented opposition to the Russo-Japanese War and in support of the position of the burgeoning Russian Communist Party. They were ineffectual, however, and succeeded only in arousing a certain amount of intellectual interest.

Industrialization proceeded, Japan profited from World War I, and the plight of the tenant farmer and the industrial laborer became more difficult. A rice riot in August 1918, which required the calling of Army units for its suppression, though in itself spontaneous, prepared many intellectuals mentally to accept any political dogma which would correct the evil conditions affecting these classes. Social Research institutes were formed in the universities and among scholars, of which the New Men's Society of Tokyo University and the Civilian Peoples' Society of Waseda University were the principal ones. Students began to study and discuss a subject new in Japan: the rights of man.

Additionally, the recession which took place in 1920 and 1921 put many laborers on the street, depressed prices, and further unsettled Japanese society.

The catalyst did not exist, however, until the formation of the Comintern in March 1919, and it was August 1921 before the first Japan Communist Party, the Gyomin-Kai or Gyomin Kyosanto, was formed; then it appeared as a secret society. Later, after the Comintern Branch in Shang-

hai had organized and instructed them, SAKAE Toshihiko, YAMAKAWA Kin, OSUGI Sakae, TAKATSU Seido and KONDO Eizo, as a preparatory committee, formed the Japan Branch of the Comintern.

This group contrived various supporting societies, prospered, sent TOKUDA Kyuichi and TAKASE Kiyoshi to Moscow in December 1921 to receive instructions, and began to plan the spread of communist propaganda throughout Japan. KONDO Eizo, however, became over bold, and together with seven of his fellows, was imprisoned for violation of the public peace regulations by criticism of the Imperial Government. Other members of the committee continued their work, and on 15 July 1922 the first general assembly of the Communist Party met. SAKAI Toshihiko, YAMAKAWA Kin, ARAHATA Kanson and TOKUDA Kyuichi formed the Central Committee of the party.

The Japanese Communist Organization swore adherence to the Comintern and obedience to its instructions to include submission to Comintern authority even though by this foreign agency Japanese party members should be called upon to break Japanese law. Thus—they bound themselves in the slave pattern of International Communism.

First Japan Communist Party

The first Japan Communist Party accepted YAMAKAWA Kin as its leader and teacher of theory. Since it existed only as a secret organization it could not conduct open political activity, but it began publication of AKAHATA to spread its ideology, and established a Labor Department to infiltrate and influence the labor unions. Also, it dispatched YAMAMOTO Kenzo to Moscow to receive further instructions of the Comintern.

During this period, SANO Gaku propagandized the Society of Deceased People, calling for a Common Front and SUZUKI Mosaburo formed the Protection and Relief Society, which strove to promote class struggle among various depressed groups.

Sectarianism sprang up, however, among party leaders who could not reconcile their views on the Emperor System and the revolutionary propriety of parliamentary action. Party influence began to decline going into practical extinction after the great Kanto Earthquake of September 1923.

Second Japan Communist Party

All important party leaders except ARAHATA agreed early in 1924 that Japan was not sufficiently developed to support a communist movement. "Since the class consciousness of the proletariat is undeveloped," YAMAKAWA Kin said, "it is best to strengthen personal enlightenment for the present, in order to pave the way for attainment of the party later."

A Liquidation Bureau was set up to give aid to social movements and the party retreated to the purely theoretical sphere. A reconstruction faction, however, soon grew up under the prodding of SANO Gaku and

YAMAMOTO Kenzo, who received instructions from the Comintern. They sent ARAHATA to Shanghai for advice in January 1925, followed later by SANO, who came back in mid-1925 with reconstruction plans and adequate funds.

By December 1925, reconstruction had proceeded to the extent of these instructions, and TOKUDA was called to Moscow to meet the Comintern Executive Committee. There he was provided with additional funds and instructions and dispatched back to Japan to reorganize the party in December of 1926 as follows:

Chairman of Central Committee	SANO Fumio, Chief of Farmers' Union Section
Central Committee Member	FUKUMOTO Kazuo, Chief of Political and Intelligentsia Section
Central Committee Member	WATANABE Masanosuke, Chief of Labor Union Section
Central Committee Member	SANO Gaku, Chief of the Proletarian Newspaper Section
Central Committee Member	ICHIKAWA Shoichi
Central Committee Member	TOKUDA Kyuichi, Japanese Representative of the Comintern
Central Committee Member	NABEYAMA Sadachika (Teishin)
Central Committee Member	NAKAO Katsuo
Chairman of Control Committee	YAMAKAWA Kin

Serious factionalism sprang up again. YAMAKAWA Kin found his parliamentary modification of the Comintern-dictated policies of defense of the Soviet Union, abolition of the Emperor System, land reform, and support of labor principles not acceptable to a more radical clique led by FUKUMOTO. He argued that the party should organize for violent revolution and swerve away from "making too much of the Intelligentsia". The Comintern settled the dispute by rejecting YAMAKAWA's theories as opportunistic and FUKUMOTO's as disrupting and ordered that a new thesis be adopted. Under this decision, the fundamentals of cellular structure were first soundly introduced to Japan, the general principles of YAMAKAWA's platform re-adopted, and the doctrine of the democratic front approved.

For a short time the party prospered, but lost caution in support of Labor-Farmer Party political activities. In the February 1928 elections (during which "manhood suffrage" was first put into practice) leaders collaborated so openly with OYAMA Ikuo, Labor-Farmer Chief, that the Japanese Government took drastic suppressive action. During what is called the "March 15th", 1928 Incident, 500 communists were arrested. Their leaders fled to Moscow and called for violent resistance on the part

of followers still in Japan. Some responded by arming themselves and combating law enforcement agents until concerted action by police brought arrest of more than 600 party members in the "April 16th" 1929 Incident.

Attempts to Renew the Party

In June of 1929, TANAKA Seigen received instructions from the Comintern to attempt party reorganizations. He bungled and the police intervened in February 1930. Nonetheless, the precept which he brought from the Comintern—that terrorism and violence should continue, and that the Japanese communists therefore must organize in armed corps—was adopted by the remaining comrades. Consequently, there were several instances of pistol fights with the police and a major riot at Kawasaki on 30 April 1930 where the communists were successful in agitating delegates at the General Council of Labor Union Delegates to a clash with the police.

The Comintern was not satisfied with progress, however, and dispatched KAZAMA Jokichi, who had been studying party tactics in Moscow, to set up an Emergency Communist Party. He received organization funds and was able to make some progress in the propagation of the Comintern's repeated dictate that the proletarian revolution should be accelerated by terroristic acts. KAZAMA erred in trying to expand party membership too rapidly and in quite openly negotiating to secure arms and ammunition illegally. Though he attracted adherents from among those hurt by depression, their qualifications were not carefully examined and the party had no secrets from the police who planted many spies in its ranks.

Funds continued to come from the Comintern, until the Manchurian Incident, when the party received a revised propaganda line but no adequate support. This revised line stressed support of the Soviet Union and liberation of Japanese Colonies, as well as domestic strife and sabotage. The only success was within farmer, labor and student front organizations where such men as KAWAKAMI Hajime, one time Kyoto University professor and leader of the Farm Labor Party, taught Marx-Lenin doctrine.

Under adversity, factionalism flared up and the fight between KAZAMA and KONNO Yojiro, the Comintern's new favorites, and SANO and NABEYAMA, imprisoned but still anxious to retain leadership, burned hot. Lack of funds drove party members to bank robbery, forgery and blackmail. The party fragmented and no group had the confidence of any other group since betrayals to the police were common. SANO and NABEYAMA dealt the final blow by publicly recanting their communistic faith.

Leaderless Period

From 1934 until October of 1945, the Japan Communist Party had no coordinated leadership, and neither was International Communism's direction so constant and certain as at other times, since the Comintern could

find no suitable political organ in Japan. This was in large part due to the completely discredited leadership of the group which formerly had supported Comintern policy. There appeared a Laborers' Sect, and Intelligentsia Sect, a Majority Sect, a Minority Sect and a Dissolution Sect, all trying to gain control of the remnants of the party and each most interested in discrediting all the others. Although the Comintern intervened and appointed leaders, none was successful in more than a very limited sphere.

Additionally, militaristic ideas were becoming more and more prevalent; ultranationalism had been nurtured by the Military to the status of a religion, and the lot of the communist—natural target of the patriot—was a dangerous one.

The Comintern continued to exert influence until its dissolution in 1943 through the Labor Magazine and its guiding genius, UCHINO Soji; through the Japan Politics and Economy Research Institute, managed by KOIWAI Kyoshi; through the Maritime Communist groups who maintained cells in Kobe, Yokohama, Hiroshima, Nagoya and Kure and received propaganda materials from Hawaii and the United States; and through cultural groups. The most significant of these groups was headed by KASUGA Shoichi and his associates, several of whom here listed became significant party leaders during the Occupation:

YAMASHIRO Yoshimune
KATO Shikai
HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Ritsu

OKABE Takashi
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
SATO Hideichi

Espionage Activity

Additionally, during this period, International Communism was in contact with Japan through the Japan Cell of the Red Army's International Spy Agency. This cell, which funnelled Japan's secrets to the Kremlin from 1933 until 1941, was headed by Richard Sorge, a German and long-time Communist Party member, assigned from the Russian Communist Party. He came to Japan ostensibly as a special correspondent of Die Frankfurter Zeitung and together with Max Klausen of the German Embassy, De Vokelitch, a French Communist, MIYAGI Yotoku, member of the American Communist Party, OZAKI Hidemi, Japanese pressman, and other associates found access to many important Japanese politicians, even including Prince KONOYE. The group, numbering technicians adept in many fields and brilliant personalities able to ingratiate themselves in any society, was notably successful in its espionage mission. There existed, too another spy organ, the responsibility of the Chinese Communist Party, which worked in Japan with the cooperation of communist NAKANISHI Ko and dispatched information to Moscow through Yenan.

III. POSTWAR RESURGENCE

Potsdam Requirements for Democracy

With the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration by Japan and the end of the Pacific War came the era of opportunity and resurgence for the Japan Communist Party. The Potsdam Declaration provided:

"The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."

This demanded the rescission of oppressive laws designed to prevent normal democratic development and the abolition of certain police agencies which enforced these laws and made it impossible for the Japanese people to enjoy freedom of thought. Additionally, it required that peoples' movements, never strong in Japan, be fostered and permitted to develop in a normal fashion and that the democratic freedom of thought, assembly, speech and unrestricted discussion be taught. As corollary, it was required that all political prisoners be released.

Removal of Restrictions

To accomplish these democratic objectives, General MacArthur, on 4 October 1945, issued to the Japanese Government SCAPIN No. 93, Subject: Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties. This SCAPIN responded to the policy for Japan prepared jointly by the State, War, and Navy Departments (SWNCC) which pointed among other objectives of the Occupation of Japan, the precepts that:

- (1) Democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion shall be encouraged.
- (2) Certain laws and ordinances discriminating on the ground of nationality, race, or any other prejudices shall be repealed.
- (3) Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authorities on political grounds shall be released.

Specifically, SCAPIN No. 93 contained these instructions:

"Release immediately all persons now detained, imprisoned, under 'protection or surveillance,' or whose freedom is restricted in any other manner who have been placed in that state of detention, imprisonment, 'protection and surveillance,' or restriction of freedom:

- (1) Under the enactments referred to in paragraph 1 a and b above.

- (2) Without charge.
- (3) By charging them technically with a minor offense, when, in reality, the reason for detention, imprisonment, 'protection and surveillance,' or restriction of freedom, was because of their thought, speech, religion, political beliefs or assembly.

"The release of all such persons will be accomplished by 10 October 1945.

"Abolish all organizations or agencies created to carry out the provisions of the enactments referred to in paragraph 1 a and b above and that part of, or functions of, other offices or sub-divisions of other civil departments and organs which supplement or assist them in the execution of such provisions. These include, but are not limited to:

- (1) All secret police organs.
- (2) Those departments in the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as the Bureau of Police, charged with supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.
- (3) Those departments, such as the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu Bu), in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, the Osaka Metropolitan Police, any other Metropolitan Police, the police of the territorial administration of Hokkaido and the various Prefectural Police charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

To assure that reactionary Japanese governmental authorities then still in office did not move through normal police agencies to throttle the newly given liberties, General MacArthur on 10 October 1945 issued SCAPIN 115 which prohibited further employment in police or related public service of persons who had been charged with the suppression of civil liberties as follows:

"The entire personnel of the Special Higher Police will be dismissed and in no case be re-employed in any position of power or responsibility over the people.

"All personnel connected with 'Protection and Surveillance' will be dismissed."

Release of Political Prisoners

As a result of these directives, 276 members of the former Japan

Communist Party were simultaneously released from Japanese jails and police surveillance. Of these, many had recanted; some honestly, as in the cases of YAMAKAWA Kin and ARAHATA Kanson, who moved immediately to the formation of the Social Democrat Party; some in expediency. Others, including TOKUDA Kyuichi, SHIGA Yoshio, MIYAMOTO Kenji, KUROKI Shigenori, ITO Ritsu, and NISHIZAWA Ryuji had no cause to make explanation; they had clung to Marxism through the years of imprisonment.

Reconstruction of Communist Party

The freed communists set about the reconstruction of the Communist Party in Japan and on the day of their release organized a Mass Rally at Hibiya Park where TOKUDA, HAKAMADA, SHIGA and MIYAMOTO formed the Japan Communist Party Reconstruction Committee and urged comrades throughout the country to rejoin them in their struggle for revolution.

Publication of the party organ AKAHATA was resumed and by 8 November 1945 the Japan Communist Party was flourishing as never before. It boasted more than 1,000 members and was strong enough to call a "First National Council" at which leaders drafted the platform for a "people's struggle." TOKUDA, HAKAMADA, KIN, MIYAMOTO, KUROKI and KAMIYAMA here perpetuated themselves as the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Mass Rally to be held at Yoyogi, Tokyo on 1 December 1945. Also were adopted "Regulations for the Guidance of the Party" which made plain that the Japan Communist Party intended through advocacy of a popular socialistic program to effect a communist state in Japan. The preamble contains the following covenant continued unchanged to this date.

"The Japan Communist Party is the vanguard of the Labor classes in Japan and is the only political party which protects working people.

"The Party is motivated by the ideology of Marx-Leninism, which is scientific socialism.

"The Party is established to campaign for the realization of principles with firm intention intensely unified and consolidated in obedience to the rules and regulations of the Party to which all the Party members must give allegiance in the same degree.

"The Party will make every effort to assure the independence of the Japanese race and world peace.

"The Party will struggle for the democratization of Japan and to expel all the reactionary influence, release laborers, farmers and all workers from exploitation and oppression by capitalists and landlords, establish the socialistic state in the most typical pattern

of democracy and make possible development of the communistic community as its final aim.

"In this socialistic state, caste will be abolished, unemployment and poverty will disappear, the rights of the working people seeking freedom and happiness will be guaranteed for the first time and people will work in correspondence to their ability and will be rewarded in accordance with the quantity and quality of their labor so that the production of all society will be splendidly advanced. Under these circumstances, remainders of the privileged regime will perish and all the abundant fruits of labor, science and culture will be possessed by the people.

"Thus, an enlightened Communistic society in which people will work in response to their ability and consume in accordance with their necessity, will be realized. The Japan Communist Party is a glorious party campaigning for establishment of this new society for the Japanese race"

Having publicly proclaimed its intention, the party, at its Fourth Convention, 1-3 December 1945, adopted the following slogans in support of the "Two Stage Revolution":

1. Democratic revolution by peaceful and democratic means.
2. Expulsion of war criminals and oppressors of human rights.
3. Abolition of the Tenno system.
4. Reformation of the system of land ownership.
5. Destruction of monopolistic capital.
6. Stabilization and elevation of the people's livelihood.

Further, this mass rally, presumably uniting Japan's most independent minds in free discussion for the first time in more than ten years, adopted the following principle of organization:

1. The Japan Communist Party, as a party of the masses, will appeal to laborers and farmers.
2. The Party will strive for organization of Labor unions in each industry.
3. Farmer unions will be organized by the Party to include all farmers who themselves till the soil.
4. Urban people will be organized in Citizens' Food Control Committees.
5. Laborers, farmers, and citizens alike will be formed into a common front to fight for human rights under the guidance of the Communist Party.

Opportunity for National Party

Here was the greatest opportunity ever to be afforded the Japan Communist Party for advancement of its popularity with the people and

achievement of leadership over them. The police organs through which the militarists had suppressed democratic organization were gone and with them all police restraints on communism. The police regulations which had prohibited communism's more overt activities were abolished. The Peace Maintenance Law, principal punitive instrument of their control, (Article 1 is included herewith as typifying its intent) could no longer be applied.

"Article 1. A person who has organized an association for the purpose of revolutionizing this country or who has engaged in tasks as an officer or other leader of such association will be sentenced to death, life imprisonment or 7 years or more in prison; a person who knowingly has joined such association or who has acted for the achievement of its objective will be sentenced to penal servitude for 3 years or more."

A new constitution guaranteeing civil liberties was certain to be promulgated. The sixteen principles for the organization of trade unions were well understood. The Japanese people were suffering from shock. Their invincible empire had proved poor and weak. Their illusions were shattered. They were ready to accept any teaching voiced in the phrases of democracy. They were desperate for a new faith and, for a short space, the communist leaders appeared to grasp their opportunity. They acted energetically and seemingly with freedom from external control. Their actions were generally intelligent, well considered and concentrated on problems dealing with the livelihood of the citizen. They appeared headed for leadership of a national Labor Farmer Party in socialistic pattern.

But only briefly did this situation exist. Soon appeared the familiar communist propaganda designed to create disorder among the illiterate and unthinking. The Communist Party leaders began to display disregard of truth and reality and conspicuous inability properly to evaluate the power of the people to think and analyze. The same party leader would one day exhort the farmer to resist the collection of rice and the next day incite the urban laborer to demonstrate for increase of the controlled rice ration. Other excesses appeared: There was disorder and riot; demonstrations were called for no purpose except disturbance of the peace. The party had proved incapable of self motivation and here first began to alienate and offend the literate liberal elements in whom it could have found strength.

NOZAKA's Thesis

Leaders concentrated on organization and with the assistance of NOZAKA Sanzo, who had fled Japan in 1930 to return in mid-January of 1946, a solid core of experienced and hardened workers was welded into

a machine destined to rule the party for the next four and one-half years.

NOZAKA's reputation was tremendous. He had served as a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in Moscow and thereafter, as advisor to the Chinese Communist Party at Yen-an. With his assistance, TOKUDA and SHIGA Yoshio, editor of the AKAHATA planned the Fifth Party Mass Rally held 7 April 1946 when party membership exceeding 7,500 was announced and the following control body established:

Secretary - General	TOKUDA Kyuichi		
Political Bureau	TOKUDA Kyuichi		
	NOZAKA Sanzo	Secretariat	TOKUDA Kyuichi
	SHIDA Shigeo		NOZAKA Sanzo
	SHIGA Yoshio		ITO Ritsu
	MIYAMOTO Kenji		HASEGAWA Hi-
	ITO Ritsu		roshi
	HASEGAWA Hi-		KAMEYAMA Ko-
	roshi		zo
	KONNO Yojiro		
	KIN Tenkai		

Chief,	Organization Department	TOKUDA Kyuichi
Chief,	Struggle Organization Department	TOKUDA Kyuichi
Chief,	Propaganda Department	NOZAKA Sanzo
Chief,	Political Affairs Research	
	Department	NOZAKA Sanzo
Chief,	Finance Department	KAMEYAMA Kozo
Chief,	Disciplinary Department	MIYAMOTO Kenji
Editor,	Party Organ, AKAHATA	SHIGA Yoshio

Preparatory thereto, a party convention met 24 February 1946 to elaborate party policy. NOZAKA's thesis, "Under the Occupation, a peaceful and democratic formula of revolution through parliamentary action is possible," found acceptance. It was around this decision that the control organ grasped hands. The party, still seeking policy, had no real agreement among the leaders except that NOZAKA's thinking and TOKUDA's strength were respected by all. These leaders attempted to bring order out of the hazy concepts of party declarations and lay a foundation for direct action.

NOZAKA's pronouncements which the party honored in greater or lesser degree until he was criticized by the Cominform in 1950 were:

- "(1) The Communist Party should become a 'likeable' party.
- "(2) The question of abolishing the Emperor system should be decided by the people at large when democracy in Japan has matured.
- "(3) Efforts should be made to remove the general impression

among the people that the communists are plotting an early revolution by force; and the people should be made to believe that the communists are sincerely working to improve the people's living conditions and that they are like others, patriotic.

- "(4) All democratically minded persons should be invited to join hands with the communists in a 'united democratic front', embracing the masses, the small and medium industrialists and the petit bourgeoisie for 'solution of the national economic crisis.'"

By this apparent shift to nationally rationalized activity the Japan Communist Party prospered. Despite its excesses and the unpopularity of some of its "struggles", it brought into its sphere for a time many of the dissident elements of Japan's postwar society.

NOZAKA believed that the Occupation would fall into policy difficulties and that International Communism would have a voice in Occupation policy through the Allied Council. But the Allied Council proved a disappointment to the Communist Party Leader. General MacArthur intelligently and effectively opposed its interference with the accomplishment of basic occupation objectives. Its Russian member continued to voice communistic sentiments at Council meetings but there was no compromise with principle and he became valueless to the International Communism, excepting that his presence in Japan made it possible to station here under the guise of staff members, Russian agents who could guide, teach and, above all else, control the local Communist Party. Had these agents not been working openly with the Japan Communist Party it is possible that in this time of unsettled course, party leaders, more Japanese than communist in inclination, could have brought about a common front with Labor-Farmer and Socialist elements on a basis of continuing cooperation and eventual communistic control through the ballot.

Warning Against Excesses

In the first months of 1946, Russia and the Japan Communist Party tried General MacArthur's strength. It was their hope that he would weakly permit the Communist Party to seize power through manipulation of the Japanese masses unprepared to exercise political freedom. The Russian and the local party leaders claimed alike that the Communist Party was a democratic party loved by the people everywhere and that it would come soon to power in all the countries of the world. When these claims became too extravagant, SCAP instructed his deputy in the Allied Council, Mr. George Acheson, Jr., to clarify the American position on the Communist Party, and he did so in a speech at the Fourth Meeting of the Allied Council, 15 May 1946, of which the pertinent excerpt follows:

"I do not need to tell you that the United States does not favor Communism either in the United States or in Japan but it has been our firm belief that in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration the Japanese people should be as free as possible to develop their political activities. The Communist Party has not been suppressed in the United States. It has not been suppressed in Japan. It has been allowed in Japan the same rights as other political parties, and members of the Communist Party have been elected to the Diet in Japan."

Communist leaders continued to call mass demonstrations and incite aggressive physical solution of political problems. General MacArthur, therefore, on 20 May 1946 issued the following statement warning the Japanese people against unruly demonstration and mass disorder:

"I find it necessary to caution the Japanese people that the growing tendency towards mass violence and physical processes of intimidation, under organized leadership, present a grave menace to the future development of Japan. While every possible rational freedom of democratic method has been permitted and will be permitted in the evolution now proceeding in the transformation from a feudalistic and military state to one of democratic process, the physical violence which undisciplined elements are now beginning to practice will not be permitted to continue. They constitute a menace not only to orderly government but to the basic purposes and security of the occupation itself. If minor elements of Japanese society are unable to exercise such self-restraint and self-respect as the situation and conditions require, I shall be forced to take the necessary steps to control and remedy such a deplorable situation. I am sure the great mass of the people condemn such excesses by disorderly minorities, but it is my sincere hope that the sane views of this predominant public opinion will exert sufficient influence to make it unnecessary to intervene."

The Communist Party leaders appeared to heed the warning; certainly the people of Japan heard and took heed. Since that date no great mass demonstrations have been incited to violence and only in isolated instances have small groups been induced by communists to take violent actions. By General MacArthur's action, the Communist Party was blocked in this avenue to revolution and forced to more subtle manipulation of the masses through labor struggles, propaganda, and front organizations.

IV. MAJOR EXTERNAL FORCES SHAPING JAPANESE COMMUNISM

International Communism

Obedience to its dictates are the terms of acceptance by International Communism. Some leaders of the party have shown a tendency to rebellion, but as was proved when the NOZAKA line party policy was criticized by the Cominform on 6 January 1950, a local party can have no self-determination.

Criticism of NOZAKA

The Cominform said in effect that the NOZAKA thesis of "revolution through parliamentary procedure" is a doctrine in advocacy of imperialism; that Japan is completely under the control of the Occupation Forces of the United States of America; and that aggressive revolutionary action must be taken in the Marx-Lenin pattern.

Party response is best indicated by the statements of its leaders. SHIGA said, "The previous principles of the party have been false as the Cominform's criticism indicates. The party should sincerely bow to superior wisdom and fight imperialism with all its might." TOKUDA, who had some pretension to stature as an independent said, "The party itself has been partially false; consequently the party has not reached the necessary development to stage a resolute struggle against imperialism."

NOZAKA decided by 6 February 1950 to bow to the Cominform and issued a statement of self-criticism in the following words: "Revolution is the problem of class struggle, which must be conducted with power. To perform this serious task, we must accept that the Japanese Communist Party has its proper part to play in the international revolutionary campaign."

Russian Influence

Within Japan the Russian Government maintains a Liaison Mission of full diplomatic status staffed by several hundred technicians, including military officers. This Mission undoubtedly serves as a major link between the Japan Communist Party and Moscow. Communist leaders, including TOKUDA, NOZAKA, ITO Ritsu and MIYAMOTO Kenji, frequented the Mission.

There is a strong suspicion that the Russian Mission has within its organization a secret body, sometimes referred to as the "G Organ",

whose purpose is control of the Japan Communist Party. This, like transmission of Russian funds to the Japan Communist Party, cannot be confirmed but logic points to its probability.

The Russian Mission has further and openly influenced the Communist Party by sponsorship of the Soviet-Japanese Friendship Society, an organization numbering possibly five thousand members, whose honorary president is the Soviet Chief of Mission, and which pays allegiance to the Soviet Union as the "spiritual fatherland." Through this society the Russian Mission gives support to the Soviet Research Institute, the Russian Language School and to various cultural and study groups. Additionally, through the North Star Commercial Company, excellent Soviet propaganda films, such as "Bride of Caucasus," "Humpback Pony," and "Tales of Siberia" are distributed throughout Japan.

Other important outside influences in the consideration of Japanese communism are the Chinese and the Korean.

Chinese Influence

Chinese influence has increased with the military successes of the Chinese Communists. Japan needs Chinese markets for survival in trade. Chinese Communist elements have collaborated with the Japanese Communist Party in threatening that Japan will be barred from Chinese markets unless she favors the Chinese Communist cause. In late 1948, NOZAKA said:

"What will then be the relation between Japan and this new China? China will require machines, industrial products and techniques from Japan, while the latter will import necessary raw materials from China. When I was in Yen-an, Mao Tse-tung told me of this plan. This, I believe, is the most important thing for Japan's rehabilitation. It is impossible to speak of Japan's rehabilitation without reference to China. How then shall we be able to enter into close contact with this new China? Are the Chinese willing to shake hands with such a reactionary and corrupt government as the Yoshida Cabinet? In regard to this, Mao Tse-tung said: 'We cannot cooperate with a Militaristic reactionary Japan. We want the Japanese to become a peace-loving, democratic nation.'"

The Japanese answer to NOZAKA was expressed by Prime Minister Yoshida, who in his statement of February 1949, pointed out that China needs machinery and manufactured goods which cannot be secured with advantage anywhere other than in Japan. Mr. YOSHIDA said:

"The Chinese are very realistic. They will trade with the

Japanese if it is profitable to them. Likewise, the Japanese will be willing to trade with a Red China. Japan is not in a position to neglect any market. Before the war, Japan did not have to worry about markets because there was a free flow of goods and a demand for Japanese goods. Now, however, the situation is changed, and it has become necessary for Japanese to think about markets. China is a natural market whether it is Communist or not."

Chinese Communist elements residing in Japan have coordinated their local activities in the Overseas Chinese Democratization Society and the Chinese-Japanese Collaboration Society through which they give some financial support to the common cause.

Korean Influence

Korean Communists have been the tool but not the partner of the Japan Communist Party. The Occupation found an oppressed and dissident Korean element in Japan. Repatriation was offered but those disinclined to follow the Rhee Government remained in Japan. Within this community, extremists organized the League of Koreans Residing in Japan whose members were controlled by determined and lawless elements demanding special privilege for all Koreans. Domination of the organization was seized with the aid of Communist Party scheming by KIN Tenkai, Chief of the handful of Koreans admitted by party leaders to their highest councils.

Though the founding purpose of the League of Koreans was to "realize the unity of Korean people, promote the welfare and culture of Korea, and set up a democratic Korean government", it soon became apparent that the organization was completely responsive to communist dictate. To carry out the will of the party, it furnished action corps of young men with whose violence the Communist Party threatened the Japanese community; and through whom wealthy Koreans were requested to make "voluntary" contributions to the party. The League became so irresponsible that it constituted a danger to the growth of democracy in Japan and on 8 September 1949, after consultation with SCAP, the Japanese Government applied the provisions of legislations implementing SCAPIN 548 to dissolve it as a terroristic organization.

Korean League leaders expected the Communist Party to protect them from such action and were disillusioned to find that the party, having used the League to its own purpose for four years, now deemed

it expedient to disclaim responsibility for their actions.

Korean influence, and indeed all external communist influence, have suffered through the abortive attack upon the Korean Republic of the North Korean puppet. Prompt [and successful] United Nations action there has proved to the Japanese that the democracies will not desert free countries in their times of need and has thereby strengthened the native Japanese resistance to the rash promises and ruthless actions of World Communism.

V. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Organization is the Communist party's greatest strength. It is a rigid and uncompromising organization prescribed by party regulations exactly defining structure and pattern of executive control. And it is dictatorial organization calling for absolute obedience—prepared to punish dissidents.

Party Regulations

The Communist Party Regulations state in preamble that the objective of the party is the establishment of a socialistic state in order to accomplish an enlightened communistic Japan.

The regulations are in ten chapters containing sixty-two articles. There is one paragraph of supplementary provisions dealing with the use of place names to designate cells or district committees.

Chapter I defines the rights and duties of party members. Membership is open to all who are of service to the party, who promise to pay dues, and who are properly proposed and accepted by cell vote. Members must be politically active, class conscious, earnest students of Marx-Leninism. Members are promised freedom to discuss party matters and to criticize party actions within party conferences. They may vote in the selection of party officers and question and criticize these officers.

Chapter II states succinctly that the party is governed under "democratic **centralization** of power". Committee members are elected by methods determined in conference. Absolute obedience to higher authority is demanded and when decisions are made all party members must comply. Party executive organization is: Central Committee, Regional Committee, Prefectural Committee, District Committee, and Cell. Lower echelons are required to report all actions to next superior echelons.

Chapter III states that the General Party Conference is the supreme organ of party power and that the Central Committee controls the calling of the General Conference and is its agent when it is not in session. The Chief Secretary and Politburo Secretary must be selected from the Central Committee. The Central Committee is elected by the General Party Conference but the Central Committee determines who is eligible to be a candidate for the Central Committee. The Central Committee calls conferences of regional party chiefs and these conferences make party policy subject to final review by the Central Committee.

Chapter IV sets up a pattern for regional organization paralleling that of the central headquarters.

Chapter V similarly details the prefectural organization.

Chapter VI lays down the like procedures guiding district organization.

Chapter VII specifies that the basic organization of the Japan Communist Party is the cell. A cell may be formed by three or more party members upon district approval. The cell collects dues from its members and carries out instructions.

Chapter VIII states that communist members of unions, farm labor fronts, cooperatives and other mass organizations must organize mutual assistance "groups" to carry out the instructions of the party.


Chapter IX restates that obedience to the party is the highest duty of the communist and adds that members will be expelled and cells dissolved for disobedience. The next higher echelon determines guilt.

Chapter X deals with the party fund. Normal party dues are 1% of definite income—the Prefectural Committee determines the proper dues of members without definite income.

Organization Chart


Party organization is pictured in the following pages.

As of 30 October 1950



★ These organs though appearing separately on the diagram are the same bodies with two functions. The bodies designated under "Deliberative" act as "Committees in conference", whereas, the bodies indicated under "Executive" act in normal guidance capacity.

TYPICAL COMMUNIST CELL ORGANIZATIONS



★Internal Cell control is managed through group leaders who instruct “groups” of cell members. The groups are set up for convenience of instruction, and usually all residents of one district or all workers in one place of employment are included in one group.

Change of Legal Leadership

From early 1946, the organization of the Japan Communist Party had been unchanged and control had remained in the hands of the same Central Committeemen. During the first six months of 1950, this group stung by Comintern criticism and goaded by adversity so abused democratic freedom in propagation of untruth and incitement to violent action that General MacArthur found it necessary to direct their removal from public office. He therefore ordered on 6 June 1950 in the following letter to Prime Minister YOSHIDA that action be taken to purge and consequently bar from all political and public service activity the whole membership of the existing Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party whom he designated by name.

"It has been a fundamental purpose of the Occupation to assist the Japanese people to meet their commitments under the Potsdam Declaration, foremost of which requires the establishment in Japan of a new order of peace, security and justice upon which may firmly stand a peacefully inclined and responsible government. To such end the Japanese Government is specifically enjoined in the Potsdam Declaration to 'remove all obstacles to the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.'

"In the implementation of this requirement, carried forward as one of the basic objectives of Allied policy as determined and prescribed by the Far Eastern Commission, the structure of the Japanese Government has been redesigned, its laws and institutions where undemocratic have been revised, and those persons whose public record gives warning that their continued influence would be inimical to democratic growth have been removed and excluded from Japan's public affairs.

"The guiding philosophy of this phase of the Occupation has been protective, not punitive. Its purpose and effect has been to provide assurance that the aims of Allied policy in the democratization of Japan would not be thwarted by the influence and pressure of anti-democratic elements. The area of its application for the most part has embraced those persons who because of position and influence bear responsibility for Japan's totalitarian policies which led to adventure in conquest and exploitation. Recently, however, a new and no less sinister groupment has injected itself into the Japanese political scene which has sought through perversion of truth and incitation to mass violence to transform this peaceful and tranquil land into an arena of disorder and strife as the means of stemming Japan's notable progress along the road of representative democracy and to subvert

the rapidly growing democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

"Acting in common accord, they have hurled defiance at constituted authority, shown contempt for the processes of law and order, and contrived by false and inflammatory statements and other subversive means to arouse through resulting public confusion that degree of social unrest which would set the stage for the eventual overthrow of constitutional government in Japan by force. Their coercive methods bear striking parallel to those by which the militaristic leaders of the past deceived and misled the Japanese people, and their aims, if achieved, would surely lead Japan to an even worse disaster. To permit this incitation to lawlessness to continue unchecked, however, embryonic it may at present appear, would be to risk ultimate suppression of Japan's democratic institutions in direct negation of the purpose and intent of Allied policy pronouncements, forfeiture of her chance for political independence, and destruction of the Japanese race.

"Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to remove and exclude the following named persons, constituting the full membership of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party, from public service, and render them subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946, (SCAPINS 548 and 550) and their implementing ordinances:

HAKAMADA Santomi	HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Kenichi	ITO Ritsu
KAMEYAMA Kozo	KAMIYAMA Shigeo
KASUGA Shoichi	KASUGA Shojiro
KONNO Yojiro	KISHIMOTO Shigeo
KURAHARA Koreto	MATSUMOTO Kazumi
MATSUMOTO Saneki	MIYAMOTO Kenji
NOSAKA Ryu	NOZAKA Sanzo
SATO Satoji	SHIDA Shigeo
SHIGA Yoshio	SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
TAKAKURA Teru	TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo
TOKUDA Kyuichi	TOSAKA Hiroshi

Sincerely yours

(sgd.) Douglas MacArthur

The Central Committee was thus removed at a stroke; the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee lost all principal members; and the Control Committee was deprived of the services of MIYAMOTO Kenji.

According to party regulation, a new Central Committee can be selected only by a General Party Conference. To this date no such conference has met, and the party has been under the direction of a Provisional Central Guidance Bureau established by the Control Committee. Membership of the Provisional Central Guidance Bureau is indicated below:

Chairman: SHIINO Etsuro
 Members: WADA Ichizo
 SUGIMOTO Fumio
 SUZUKI Ichizo
 KAWADA Kenji
 TADA Tomeji *
 KIKUNAMI Katsumi **
 TANIGUCHI Zentaro ***

* Expelled from JCP, 16 Aug. 50

** Purged, AKAHATA Staff, 7 June 50

*** Purged, 28 June 50

The Central Guidance Bureau has probably received assistance from certain Central Committee members purged by General MacArthur's order; however, such fact though generally accepted, cannot be proved. It is known, however, that no new Central Committee, Central Committee Candidates' Pool, Political Bureau, Secretariat, or Control Committee members have been designated. New chiefs have been designated for the various departments. The following are the best available listings of important Communist Party officers and heads of principal departments:

Members of Principal Party Organs

Central Committee Candidate Pool (Chuo Iinkai Koho)

** HARADA Choji
 HOSAKA Hiroaki (Komei)
 IWATA Eiichi
 KONISHI Masao
 NISHIDATE Hitoshi
 SUNAMA Kazuyoshi
 ** TADA Tomeji
 ** TOSAKA Ryoichi
 YAMAMOTO Hitoshi

Secretariat (Shogi Kyoku)

Secretary General:

* TOKUDA Kyuichi

Political Bureau (Seiji Kyoku)

* HASEGAWA Hiroshi
 * ITO Ritsu
 * KONNO Yojiro
 * MIYAMOTO Kenji
 * NOZAKA Sanzo
 * SHIDA Shigeo
 * SHIGA Yoshio
 * SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
 * TOKUDA Kyuichi

Control Committee (Tosei Iinkai)

Chief: SHIINO Etsuro

Members:

* HAKAMADA Satomi
* ITO Ritsu
* KAMEYAMA Kozo
* KASUGA Shojiro
* KONNO Yojiro
* MATSUMOTO Mimasu
* NOZAKA Sanzo
* SHIDA Shigeo
* SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
* TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo

WADA Ichiro

* MIYAMOTO Kenji
OKADA Bunkichi
YAMABE Kentaro
IWAMOTO Iwao
NISHIZAWA Ryuji
** MATSUMOTO Soichiro
** MASUDA Kakunosuke

Cooperators:

SHIINO Etsuro
NISHIZAWA Ryuji

* Purged Central Committee
** Expelled from JCP for schismatic activity

Heads of Principal Departments **Japan Communist Party**

Before Purge of 6 June 1950

INOUE Morio

** KAWAMURA Tatsuo
TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo
* KASUGA Shojiro ***

Labor Union Department:

* MATSUMOTO Saneki (Mimasu)

Agrarian Affairs:

OMURA Einosuke

Cultural Affairs:

KOMATSU Yuichiro

Propaganda and Education:

SHIINO Etsuro

Research (Investigation):

IJIRI Masaji

Scientific and Technique:

AKIYAMA Yoshiaki

Publication:

UGAI Nagatoshi

AKAHATA Department:

* SHIGA Yoshio ***

* ITO Ritsui

** ANEBA Saburo ***

ZENEI Magazine:

New World Magazine:

Women's Affairs:

SHIINO Etsuro

Youth Affairs:

ONDA (Mita) Hideichi

(Shuichi)

Present (30 October 1950)

KAWADA Kenji

OKADA Bunkichi

UCHINO Takechiyo

YAMABE Kentaro

SUZUKI Ichizo

KIMURA Saburo

TERADA Mitsugu

KOHARA Yoshi

FUKAYA Susumu

NISHIKAWA Ryuji

MURAYAMA Tomoyoshi

KOMATSU Yuichiro

YAMAMOTO Aki (Shu)

HORIE Yuichi (Muroichi)

IZUMI Toshio

ISHII Kinosuke

AKAIWA Katsumi

SUZUKI Tomino

MATSUMOTO Masaji

WADA Ichizo

YANO Osamu

SHIOYA Ai (Shiotani)

KARITA Asano

FUJIO Mamoru

KOIDE Takashi

KOBAYASHI Shin (Nobu)

People's Affairs:

* KAMIYAMA Shigeo

IWATA Eiichi

Local Affairs Department:

* NOZAKA Sanzo

Urban Peoples:

* KAMIYAMA Shigeo

Party Historical:

* SHIGA Yoshio ***

Party Clinic:

SATO Takeo

Central Publishing Company:

IIDA Isaburo

Marx-Lenin:

HORIE Muraichi

Soviet Culture Propaganda:

* NOZAKA Sanzo

Legal Affairs:

KAZAHAYA Yasoji

General Affairs:

SUGIMOTO Hamako

Maritime & Fishermen's:

* HAKAMADA Satomi ***

Repatriates Affairs:

* TSUMURA Kenji

Juvenile Affairs:

FUSE Misao

Political Affairs:

IWATA Eiichi

Election Policy:

* KONNO Yojiro

Organization Guidance:

(Dantai Shido Bu)

Enterprise:

SUGIMOTO Fumio

DOKI Tsuyoshi

INOUE Morio

KAMIMURA Susumu

TATSUTA Seiu

HIJIKATA Yoshi

KAWAJIRI Yasuji

SHIINO Etsuro

ONO Yoshihiko

Pioneer Affairs:

Party School:

* Purged Central Committee

** Purged AKAHATA Staff

*** Internationalist Faction

IWATA Eiichi
MATSUSHIMA Matsutaro
KAWAKAMI Kanichi
KITAZOE Tadao

IZU Kimio
KAWASAKI Misaburo
MATSUMURA Kazuto

There is some indication that a Central Reconstruction Guidance Committee exists consisting of the principal party organizers of the national, regional, prefectural and district levels. The structure of this group presumed to be charged with "second party activity" is reported to be as follows:

Chairman:	IWATA Eiichi
Responsible Official:	IWAMOTO Iwao
Members:	MATSUMOTO Yoshiji—Shin-etsu Region
(Known as national	KAJITA Shigeo—Kanto Region
organizers' group)	ONDA (Mita) Shuichi—Tohoku Region
	TANAKA Gyohei—Kansai & Shikoku
	Regions
	KITAZOYE Tadao—Kyushu Region
	* KANEKO Kenta—Tokai Region
	KARITA Asano—Hokkaido Region

* Purged for connection with Zenroren, 30 August 1950

VI. ELECTIONS

Election Aims

Beginning on 10 October 1945 with their release by SCAP order from imprisonment for illegal political activity, the Communist Party leaders prepared for occupied Japan's first election. Their ruling political philosophy, though sometimes criticized within the party and finally blasted by the Cominform in 1950, was that of NOZAKA, who believed "legal revolution through parliamentary procedures possible under the Occupation". Internally he explained his theory as "application of strategy whereby the people can be won over to Communist principles through socialism from within the Diet". He argued that the party should lay a legal foundation for taking over the reins of government and that other and less acceptable party methods leading to social unrest and confusion should be subordinated to the creation of a "lovable party".

Secretary-General TOKUDA supported NOZAKA's political thesis and at the Fourteenth General Assembly of the Central Committee in March of 1948, he said, "Since Japan's political independence is guaranteed by the words of the Potsdam Declaration, the Communist Party can certainly come to power if it enjoys the confidence of the people, and without their confidence, it will not be able to administer the affairs of State. The more seats the Communist Party can obtain in the Diet, the more easily we can seize the reins of the government. If the Communist Party can legally obtain thirty or more seats in the Diet it will become so influential over the government that the government will not be able to take unfavorable action against us."

In the application of this theory, the Communist Party concentrated on making the best possible showing in every election. Any issue which had public appeal was seized upon. More important, the party organized cells and conducted coordinated political activity in every area from the center of the largest city to the corner of the smallest farming village. Mass political rallies were held to whip up the enthusiasm of party workers and party line political issues were widely propagandized.

Poor Showing at Polls

Despite these efforts and relatively well-advised legal political maneuvering, Japanese antipathy to what many consider an alien controlled group blocks the turn of any considerable support to the party's candidates. By continuous effort, the party has achieved a vote norm of about five and one-half percent. Only occasionally is this exceeded. In the House of Representatives' election, January 1949, it was almost doubled by a temporary shift of Socialist votes.

Factors responsible for this temporary shift were: The disillusionment of the Japanese labor voter by reason of governmental scandals recently disclosed; pay readjustments and increased working hours forced upon salaried employees by the financial stringency; and the recently attained communist control in China which had been given constant headline attention in the Japanese press and had aroused apprehension among some Japanese that support should be given to the Communist Party in order to avoid its future displeasure.

NABEYAMA Sadachika, left-wing political leader and commentator, in propounding the theory that the Communist Party's 1949 increased vote resulted from losses of the socialist parties, compiled the following table from official election statistics:

Party	1947	1949
Social Democrats	7,170,484	4,129,724
Social Reformists	—	387,214
Labor-Farmers	—	606,744
Communists	996,507	2,984,583
Total	8,166,991	8,108,265

Results of Successive Elections

National Elections

In the general election of April 1946 the Communist Party entered 143 candidates for the House of Representatives and elected 5. The vote received was 2,135,757, or 3.8 per cent of the total (plural voting).

In the general election for members of the House of Representatives in April 1947, the Communist Party entered 120 candidates and elected 4. The vote received was 996,507, or 3.7 per cent of the total (single ballot system). In the election for members of the House of Councillors during the same month, 40 candidates were entered by the Communists—12 in the national constituency and 28 in prefectural constituencies. Of these candidates 4 were elected, 3 from the national constituency and 1 at the prefectural level. The total number of votes accorded the Communist candidates was 825,304 (3.7 per cent of the total) on the local level and 610,948 (2.9 per cent of the total) in the national constituency.

In the general election of January 1949 for members of the House of Representatives, the Communist Party entered 115 candidates and elected 35. The total vote received was 2,984,583 or 9.6 per cent of the total. The Communist gain was the result of the near-disintegration of the Social Democratic Party which lost 62 seats.

In the June 1950 general election for members of the House of Councillors, 50 candidates entered by the Communist Party—38 in prefectural constituencies, and 12 in the national constituency—received 1,637,451 (5.7 per cent) of the total vote in the national constituency, and 1,333,872 (4.8 per cent) of the total cast at the prefectural level. Two of the party's candidates, both in the national constituency, were elected.

Local Elections

In April 1947, when the Japanese for the first time elected prefectural, city, town and village executives and assembly members by universal adult suffrage, the Communist Party score in terms of the number of candidates elected was as follows:

Prefectural governors	0
Prefectural assemblymen	4
Mayors	0
City assemblymen	36
Town and Village headmen	11
Town and Village assemblymen	380
Total	431

In 2,011 local elections held during 1949, Communist Party candidates were elected to 100 of the 7,364 posted vacancies—1.3 per cent of the total. Of the 100 successful candidates, 31 were seated in uncontested elections. One was elected to membership in a prefectural assembly, 7 to city assemblies and the remaining 92 at the town and village level. During the latter part of this period the communist candidates' vote-getting ability showed a steady decline.

In the election held 18 August 1949 when farmers throughout Japan selected 110,723 Land Commissioners, Communist Party candidates were elected to 953 seats—0.9 per cent of the total.

In local elections held 1 January—1 October 1950, 3.8 per cent of the total vote cast in 1,133 elections went to communist candidates. The 57 seats secured by communist candidates representing 1.3 per cent of 4,328 contested were:

Governors	0
Prefectural assemblymen	0
Mayors	0
City assemblymen	9
Town and Village headmen	1
Town and Village assemblymen	47
Total	57

Communist failure at the polls is graphically assessed by the comparisons below of the relative voter support of the party in elections of 1949, 1950 and 1951 in Hiroshima and Fukushima.

HIROSHIMA

Type of Election	Date	Total Vote Cast	Communist Vote	Percent of Total
House of Representatives	23 Jan 49	832,159	87,178	10.4
House of Councillors	4 Jun 50	776,209	36,830	4.9
Governors Election	22 Jan 51	919,791	16,739	1.8

FUKUSHIMA

Type of Election	Date	Total Vote Cast	Communist Vote	Percent of Total
House of Representatives By-election	23 Jan 49	724,572	60,483	8.34
for Governor	23 Jan 50	711,535	37,327	5.24
House of Councillors	4 Jun 50	711,326	37,143	5.21
House of Councillors By-election	12 Feb 51	781,182	8,645	1.12

Party leaders many times have appealed to Socialists and Labor-Farmers for a common front. These overtures, except in some purely local campaigns, invariably have been rejected, despite claims to the contrary. Periodically since May 1947, the Socialists have publicly disavowed any common front inclinations. "Racial Democracy" and "Racial Independence", slogans adopted by the Communist Party in December 1947 have not deceived the electorate.

Elective Posts Held

Following is a tabulation of elective posts held by communists on 1 January 1951:

Elective Office	Seats	Com-munists Elected ('47)	Com-munists Elected ('49)	Com-munists Elected ('50)	Seats Now Held	% of Total
House of Representatives	466	4	35		27	5.8
House of Councillors	250	4	0	2	4	1.6
Prefectural Governors	46	0	0	0	0	0.0
Prefectural Assemblymen	2,494	4	1	0	6	0.2
Mayors	257	0	0	0	0	0.0
City Assemblymen	8,969	51	5	11	87	0.9
Town and Village Headmen	10,160	11	3	1	16	0.1
Town and Village Assemblymen	181,900	365	75	50	694	0.3
Total	203,695	439	119	64	834	0.40

VII. FACTIONS AND SCHISMS

International dissensions have troubled the Japan Communist Party from its inception in the early 1920's. Though party members unanimously acknowledge Marx-Leninism as their ideological standard and International Communism as their master, they cannot for long agree in the interpretation of either the philosophy of the first or the orders of the latter. Factional disputes between leaders prominent in regional organizations, personality clashes always present when strong minds meet, and personal jealousies perpetuate disunity. Disintegration has not resulted because the dictates of Marx-Leninism will not permit open conflict in the party. Party regulations are inflexible and attacks against the leadership, no matter how fundamental they may appear, must be settled in unanimity so that all the members can move as one. This iron control restricts and welds the party even though its elements feel dissatisfaction. Submission to the dictates of the leaders or expulsion from the party are the only alternatives.

First Postwar Factions

First factions to spring up in the postwar Japan Communist Party were the Fuchu and the Kuramae Factions. The Fuchu Faction headed by TOKUDA Kyuichi and SHIGA Yoshio was so-called because its principal members were jailed in Fuchu Penitentiary. In addition to TOKUDA and SHIGA it included "martyred leaders" MIYAMOTO Kenji, HASEGAWA Hiroshi, ITO Ritsu, MATSUMOTO Ichizo and HAKAMADA Satomi.

The Kuramae Faction boasted no long imprisoned martyrs. Its significant leaders, KAMIYAMA Shigeo, HOSOKAWA Karoku and NAKANISHI Ko, had valued personal freedom above profession of principle. Now they say they voiced abandonment of communism in order to gain freedom the better to carry on the struggle. This group met in the Kuramae Industrial Hall in Shimbashi where gathered intellectuals and those interested principally in theoretical communism.

These factions disintegrated with the return of NOZAKA Sanzo who assumed leadership of the intellectuals and with the reinstitution of normal party organization. Members of the Fuchu Faction seized most of the important posts in the permanent organization. NOZAKA despite his great prestige was more the collaborator than rival of TOKUDA.

TOKUDA, SHIGA and NAKANISHI Factions

The Party Control Organs responsive to the strong hand of TOKUDA Kyuichi brooked no argument or opposition. Some resentment began to grow up among the leaders of powerful regional committees. However,

resistance to the central faction of Secretary-General TOKUDA, NOZAKA, HOSAKA Komei, ITO Ritsu and SHIDA Shigeo was ineffective except in the Kansai where SHIGA Yoshio, KASUGA Shojiro and MIYAMOTO Kenji were strong. So long as SHIGA held position with NOZAKA and TOKUDA as one of the Japan Communism's Big Three, his group had no dynamic leadership, but when he lost his Diet seat in April 1947, he blamed lack of support from the central headquarters and in pique withdrew from headquarters work to strengthen his local position in the Kansai District. By late 1948, his Kansai position was so secure that he felt able to challenge TOKUDA, and he began a series of intra-party attacks against what he termed "bureaucratic control." Except when they clashed over revenues of AKAHATA of which SHIGA was editor, MIYAMOTO Kenji, financial director of the party, supported SHIGA. Other principal headquarters officials oppose him at present but his Kansai position is so strong that he will not be expelled from the party except as a final resort.

NAKANISHI Ko, too, has independent ideas. He advocates social revolution as the first step to the Communist State and refuses to be silenced by defeat in the party councils. He does not draw support from the major factions and both have denounced him as a left-wing opportunist. When he publicly criticized party leadership in late 1949, he was expelled from membership.

Centralist-Internationalist Schism

The lack of unity of thought among Communist Party leaders was spotlighted by the Cominform criticism in early 1950 of NOZAKA's thesis of a "lovable party" and revolution by "parliamentary procedures." Rank and file confidence in the infallibility of party leadership was shaken and, though the centralist faction continued overwhelmingly predominant, definite schisms sprang up sharply dividing party leaders in the following pattern:

Factions Within Japan Communist Party

CENTRALIST

*TOKUDA Kyuichi	KIN TEN KAI	HOSOKAWA Karoku
*NOZAKA Sanzo	SHIINO Etsuro	KAZAHAYA Yasoji
*ITO Ritsu	WADA Ichizo	KARITA Asano
*HASEGAWA Hiroshi	SUZUKI Ichizo	UEMURA Susumu
*KONNO Yojiro	KAWADA Kenji	INOUCHI Masao
*MATSUMOTO Saneki	SUGIMOTO Fumio	KAWAKAMI Kanichi
*SHIDA Shigeo	YAMABE Kentaro	WATANABE Yoshimichi
*KASUGA Shoichi	IWAMOTO Iwao	NASHIKI Sukejiro
*SATO Satoji	NISHIZAWA Ryuji	TAJIRO Fumihisa
*TAKENAKA Shosaburo	OKADA Bunkichi	FUKAZAWA Yoshinori
	IWATA Eiichi	
	HOSAKA Komei	

INTERNATIONALIST

*MIYAMOTO Kenji	MASUDA Kakunosuke	TADA Tomeji
*SHIGA Yoshio	TACHIBANA Toshio	MASUDA Haruo
*KASUGA Shojiro	YAMANA Masami	HONJO Isshin
*KAMEYAMA Kozo	NAITO Tomomichi	INOUE Masata
*KURAHARA Koreto	TAKAHASHI Eisuke	MIYAJIMA Yutaka
*TAKAKURA Teru	*HAKAMADA Satomi	NODA Yasaburo
TOSAKA Ryoichi	HARADA Choji	UTAGAWA Keizo

NAKANISHI FACTION

NAKANISHI Ko	NAKANISHI Atsuchi	NAKANISHI Sanyo
MATSUMOTO Soichiro	SATO Noboru	KUBO Shigetoshi
FUKUMOTO Kunio	MIYAHARA Toshio	

NEUTRAL

*KAMIYAMA Shigeo	***DOBASHI	SUNAMA Ichiryo
*ITO Kenichi	Kazuyoshi	KIMURA Sakae
*SHIRAKAWA Seiichi	**KIKUNAMI Katsumi	FUKUMOTO Kazuo

* Purged, Central Committee—6 June 1950

** Purged, Akahata Staff—7 June 1950

*** Purged, Zenroren—30 August 1950

The Centralists retain control of the formal party organization. They believe that the Japan Communist Party should, in expediency, advocate Japanese neutrality in the international struggle of capitalism versus communism; and that Japanese capitalists and property holders represented by the Yoshida Government rather than America are their most vulnerable enemies. Further, they believe that the present party leadership exercised by them is competent, efficient and in accordance with Marx-Lenin doctrine.

The Internationalists advocate closer adherence to the Cominform line of all-out attack upon "American imperialism." They maintain that no expediency justifies a pretense that Japan can be neutral in the struggle between capitalism and communism; and they believe present leadership is incompetent, dictatorial and out of accord with doctrine.

Reconciliation Certain

Irreconcilables have appeared in the rank and file of both factions and each group spies upon the other. Minorities which ordinarily submit to party guidance are confused. The rift appears serious; however, there is strong pressure from International Communism for reconciliation. Leaders of both groups know the fatal consequences of fragmentation. They will accede to mediation and the breach will mend, for no leader of Japan Communism believes the party strong enough to survive in Titoism.

VIII. FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

In the pattern of International Communism, the Japan Communist Party, unable to draw wide popular support to its own banner, employs the tactic of promoting popular fronts and infiltrating communists among the leadership of organizations concerned with the welfare of particular groups. The Communist Party endeavors by this means to dominate labor movements in Japan and it has made similar attempts at domination of student movements, women's movements, movements in support of third nationals, and peace and cultural movements. More disturbing, it has attempted to create and unite under its guidance elements dissident to the Occupation by appealing to racial pride and decrying the irritations inevitable to an occupation situation. Fortunately the camouflage has worn thin, the people are increasingly aware, and front organizations generally have become ineffective in the development of widespread support for communist causes.

Common Political Front

As early as 19 October 1945, communist leaders approached the Socialist Party and proposed a common front or, as it was referred to by the party in a statement of 8 November 1945, "A people's front to form a people's republic." The communists have been carrying on similar efforts since that time:

On 21 December 1947, the party publicly called for a "Democratic Racial Front" and in February 1948, concrete proposals along this line were made to leaders of the Social Democrats, Labor-Farmers and other organizations numbering left-wing sympathizers among their members. The Communist Party's thesis is that the Japanese Government, with the support of the Occupation, has violated the Potsdam Declaration; that only Russia defends the Potsdam Declaration; and that Japan is being enslaved and colonized by international monopolistic capital under the protection of the "American imperialists."

This thesis found acceptance among some of the more radical elements of the labor unions and student organizations, and with their support the communist-dominated Democratization Protection League was established on 27 August 1948. The Democratization Protection League has not prospered, being torn by dissension among its communist and non-communist components and has proved an ineffective political weapon.

Farmers' Union

The Communist Party endeavored similarly to control the Japan Farmers' Union but lost this organization to anti-communist leadership

despite the excellent preparatory work of the Farm Village Operations Corps which sent agents to every hamlet to advise farmers on problems concerning their livelihood. The party's activities among the farmers failed principally because SCAP-directed Farm Land Reform programs were put into effect early in the Occupation, settling the problem of tenant farm dissension.

Women's Organizations

In order to control for party ends the women of Japan now given political voice by the new Constitution, the Communist Party was active in the organization of such groups as the Democratic Women's Conference. The Democratic Women's Group and the Working Women's Society. However, despite party claims that its efforts on the behalf of the women of Japan have contributed materially to their present status of political equality, women's groups continue basically moderate if not actually conservative in direction.

Student Self-Government Association

In the colleges and universities of Japan, party organizers found a group ready to hear extremist propaganda. The youth of Japan does not have the feeling of war guilt held by the older generation or the background to realize the tremendous and unusual problems facing the Japanese in the rehabilitation of their country. They know only that they are subjecting themselves to an austere daily routine. They are discouraged by the diverse difficulties of their daily lives, slow to appreciate the gradual economic recovery of their country, and prone to blame the government and the Occupation for their discomforts.

It is into such mental gaps that the party's propaganda has best infiltrated. Party dominated groups began to assume the leadership of students' self-government associations and were able to foment additional dissention among the students. The National Autonomous Students' Self-Government Association which was formed under Communist Party auspices in 1948 became dominant among student organizations. It had chapters in 60 per cent of Japan's institutions of higher education. For a time it was controlled by members of the Communist Young Men's Counter-Measures Section of the Japan Communist Party.

Communist influence exercised over students through this organization was strengthened by ill-advised persons in authority who criticized certain liberal professors and threatened action depriving them of academic positions. Considerable adverse publicity resulted and the Self-Government Association was handed—ready made—a popular cause.

Had the Communist Party retained its solidarity, it could have used the Students' Self-Government Association to excellent advantage in the Democratic Racial Front. As Communist Party central leadership dis-

integrated, however, so did communist control of the Association, and in mid-1949 the party had so thoroughly lost touch with influential Student Association leaders that in punishment of their dissidence, cells in Waseda and Tokyo Universities were dissolved. At present, less than 10 per cent of students are subject to communist-dominated leadership and the vast number have rejected communism as a political ideology. They realize that their primary interest is the rapid attainment of the education for which they and their parents are making considerable sacrifice, and that student strikes, examination boycotts and like communist student struggle tactics militate against their interests.

Cultural Groups

Practicing intellectuals and liberal scholars, scientists, artists and entertainment world personalities pride themselves upon openness of mind and willingness to hear any prophet. To appeal to this group, the Communist Party organized the Japan Democratic Cultural League. The League has 23 carefully nurtured affiliates including poets, actors, lawyers, doctors and the advocates of Esperanto. Its principal value to the party is that it has attracted to membership some well-known names which are exploited in recruitment drives. This group also assists propaganda efforts by supplying entertainers and attraction personalities to perform at gatherings where those attracted by personality or performance are subject to communist indoctrination.

Peace Movements

Among other front organizations dominated by the communists are factions actively advocating Russian and Sino-Japanese cooperation, the Stockholm Peace Movement, and other causes now so well identified with International Communism that some who might otherwise be attracted are kept away through distrust of the communist motive.

Business and Trade Appeals

Societies to promote trade with China aroused considerable interest among businessmen of Osaka, Tokyo and Nagoya in 1949 but faded as they proved of little commercial influence. As in earlier attempts to attract small and medium entrepreneurs by offers of tax benefits, the party found that promise of advantage to this shrewd element was answered by promise of support when advantage materialized and that any support granted was calculated on sound business principles.

IX. INFLUENCE AMONG REPATRIATES

Of six million Japanese outside the main islands upon the termination of war, some 1,400,000 came to be controlled by Russia. Russia's handling of these Japanese citizens has greatly embarrassed the Japan Communist Party and contributed more than any other single factor to early recognition by the Japanese people of Russian insincerity. The Japanese in the hands of Russia died of hardship, cold and deprivation in tens of thousands during the first winters of their captivity. They were forced by their captors to work as slave laborers in lumber and construction camps in the most desolate areas of Siberia. They were transported wherever Russia needed more hands for harsh work. The Japanese believe that some were herded across Asia into the Ukraine to work on rehabilitation projects there. Now Russia has announced the completion of the repatriation program and the families of more than 375,000 do not know whether their dear ones are alive or dead.

Embarrassment of Local Party

The Japan Communist Party struggled to explain failure to return these Russian captives as the fault of the Japanese Government or of the Occupation authorities, stating that ships were not furnished or that negotiations were conducted in bad faith and broken off before they could be finalized. SCAP has many times refuted these statements and on 13 June 1949 he said on the subject:

"This failure to meet international commitments and maintain normal standards of human decency in the disposition of captives finds little parallel in the history of modern civilization, and is calculated so to outrage moral sensibilities that even the Japanese Communists have been moved to register a bitter and indignant protest. The burdened effort at this late date to challenge the number long publicly recorded as held in Soviet hands by charging mathematical error is small solace indeed to the hundreds of thousands of Japanese homes from whom no sophistry can conceal the fact that a family member in Soviet custody has failed to return; and as to whom, contrary to all international covenants respecting prisoners of war, no word whatsoever has been received during the long period of captivity."

In November of 1948, TOKUDA Kyuichi publicly requested that the Soviet member of the Allied Council use his influence on the Kremlin to speed repatriation, and propagandized that the Japan Communist Party would solve the repatriation problem. Russia soon thereafter agreed to

resume repatriation. When the first contingent of repatriates reached Maizuru on 27 June 1949, her purpose became apparent.

Indoctrination Before Repatriation

These repatriates had been subject to strenuous indoctrination while under Russian control. They had been told that living conditions in Japan under the Occupation were so miserable that no worker or farmer could be sure of daily rice and that a reign of terror was being perpetrated by the Occupation Forces and their collaborators of the Japanese Government.

Having no other channels of information and being daily subject to this propaganda and to praise of the communist line—and in order to alleviate their own circumstances and secure release from imprisonment—these repatriates agreed to accept communism, pledging themselves to work for the communist cause. Upon their return, they ignored their friends, refused to see members of their families who had come to meet them, marched in groups to demonstrations arranged by the communists, and conducted themselves in such unseemly fashion that the whole Japanese people were disgusted with them and their communist mentors.

Many of them were expected to join the Communist Party, and it was International Communism's hope to use them as shock troops in terrorism and violence when the time was ripe for revolution. The program however failed when the repatriates by their own observation learned how they had been deceived.

Counter Measures

The question of counter-propaganda indoctrination of these repatriates was often raised in the period immediately after their return. Such action was deliberately avoided. Its value in counter-indoctrination would have been doubtful, and it would have required segregation of these men in schools or camps, contrary to the Potsdam provision that the Japanese military force after being completely disarmed be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

The course selected by the Japanese Government under guidance of SCAP was to return the repatriates as quickly as possible to their homes where, under the healing influence of normal community life, they could discover the hollowness of their previous indoctrination and settle into normal, useful lives. As time has proved, this course was the practical as well as the honest one, and the Communist Party plan for the absorption of the repatriates and their conversion into active party members has completely failed.

Indication that the party recognizes this is found in a directive issued by the Central Committee to Prefectural Committees at the time the repatriates were being returned to Japan, which contains the following:

"As the families of the repatriates are nearly all anti-Soviet and anti-communist, and as it will be difficult to absorb them into our organization after they settle down, because of the strained condition of their livelihood, efforts must be made this year to absorb them into the party before they return to their homes."

Repatriates' Accusations

Many of the repatriates who appeared to have been thoroughly indoctrinated have turned upon the party with the accusation that the party leaders requested Russia hold Japanese prisoners in Siberia until they were converted to communism.

On the basis of these accusations, the Repatriation Committee of the Diet requested the testimony of TOKUDA on 16 March 1950. His embarrassment was apparent from the fact that he appeared at the inquiry only once despite repeated demands for his attendance. During this appearance he was forced into practical admission that the Communist Party has been guilty of self-contradiction by calling for strict adherence to the Potsdam Declaration on the one hand while defending Russia's violation of specific Potsdam repatriation promises on the other.

Repatriate Organizations

There still exists an organization of repatriates paying lip service to the Communist Party. The Japan Repatriates Union has pledged itself to "fight for the protection of Russia and Communist China and for world peace." Its slogan is, "Every returnee from the Soviet area should work to accelerate friendly relations between Japan and Russia." The party has tried to assist the members of this organization in livelihood problems and since membership is small, for a time was able to support them; but party financial difficulties have thwarted any impressive development of such a program with resultant bad feeling in the Repatriates' organization whose officers now criticize the Guidance Section and threaten disobedience.

X. PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA ACTIVITY

General Propaganda Activity

The Japan Communist Party does not neglect propaganda. Every available medium is used to put the party's views before the people. Numbers of Japan's wandering story tellers, the "papershow men," are subsidized to relate party merits and berate capitalism. Posters, wall newspapers, and leaflets are distributed and displayed in public places. Russian-produced motion pictures, some of excellent audience appeal, are promoted. Entertainers, actors and well known persons in the world of culture attracted to the party or its fringes are exploited to the utmost. Fullest advantage is taken of political campaign opportunities and the speech immunity of members of the Diet in Chamber.

Akahata and the Public Press

The most important channel of propaganda available to the communists in Japan was the public press. Newspapers of general and of specialized circulation appeared in numbers. Magazines were published to appeal to various segments of society including youth and intelligentsia.

The communist press here as elsewhere must serve a two-fold party purpose, disseminate instructions to the faithful, and propagandize those sympathetic to the party in particular and all dissident members of the social community in general. Despite these restrictions on the journalist, the Japan Communist Party succeeded remarkably in its newspaper projects until the Cominform criticism of NOZAKA's "parliamentary revolution" policy.

From October 1945 when AKAHATA reappeared until June 1950 communist newspapers grew in number, strength, and reader coverage. AKAHATA, the party organ, first appeared as a pamphlet of 15 pages printed weekly and distributed in 3,000 copies. By January 1946, it was printed at five day intervals as a tabloid and distributed in 50,000 copies. In August 1946, publication was made each third day; however distribution briefly dipped to 30,000 copies. On 1 August 1947, AKAHATA became a daily newspaper whose circulation reached 150,000. By January 1949, it was printed in local and metropolitan editions, and distributed to 200,000 subscribers. By May 1950, three editions (evening, local and metropolitan) were published and 280,000 copies distributed daily.

AKAHATA was printed by the AKATSUKI Printing Company in Yoyogi, Tokyo, adjacent to the party headquarters. The AKATSUKI Printing Company was the only major printing company controlled by the Japan Communist Party and of the many local communist publications, generally only those which could avail themselves of the AKATSU-

KI plant were printed; others were mimeographed. About 100 regions and districts published mimeographed organs distributed at varying intervals. All major cells produced and distributed mimeographed cell newspapers.

AKAHATA's editor, SHIGA Yoshio, able party leader and faithful worker, gathered around him a staff which ran AKAHATA as nearly as possible according to good newspaper methods. Their efforts were productive both of propaganda result and monetary profit; AKAHATA in 1949 was the most influential political party newspaper in Japan and could turn several million yen into the party treasury. At that time Central Headquarters' publications were:

	Size	Circulation	Publication
AKAHATA Daily	2 pgs	230,000	Daily
AKAHATA Weekly	4 pgs	100,000	Weekly
VANGUARD Magazine	40-50 pgs	25,000	Monthly
NEW WORLD Magazine	40-50 pgs	6,000	"
TAISHU Club Magazine	20-30 pgs	12,000	"
SCIENCE and TECHNIQUE Magazine	30-40 pgs	9,000	"
RESEARCH REPORT	30 pgs	11,000	"
FRIENDS Newspaper	4 pgs	10,000	Weekly

Propaganda Slants

In keeping with NOZAKA's thesis of "two-stage revolution," AKAHATA continuously criticized existing Japanese Governments. On 25 August 1948, NOZAKA in an article entitled, Characteristic of a New Fascism, said "The Fascism of today is serving not only the capital of its own country but the interests of its new master. In short, it is a traitorous fascism. The new fascism leaves the democratic principles as they are, but as a matter of fact it is bent on destroying them."

Columns were daily crammed with incitement to class warfare, shaped facts and misrepresentations of the most dishonest character. When SCAP in July 1948 addressed the Prime Minister in a letter relating to legislation governing the conduct of government employees, AKAHATA twisted the context of the letter to the advantage of the communist propaganda line but did so in a manner that plausibly could be explained away as editorial carelessness. Whenever opportunity presented, AKAHATA warped the news to suit the party's propaganda interests.

AKAHATA yet had not directly criticized the Occupation. The Attorney General's Office made the following report August 1949, "The Organs of the party headquarters are cautious and to this date no anti-occupation articles have appeared on the surface."

By the Cominform criticism of January 1950 however, the party was placed in an impossible position: Failure to attack the Occupation in available organs would further offend the Cominform—attack on the Occupation would certainly bring drastic action under the Press Code. SHIGA who had never been a staunch believer in the NOZAKA thesis

and who was fanatic enough to sacrifice the AKAHATA at the bidding of International Communism, saw but one course. He began publication of dishonest and vicious attacks upon America and the Occupation.

SCAP Warnings

At the same time, communist Diet members attacked the Occupation from the floor of the Diet. General Whitney, SCAP's Chief of Government Section, moved at once to warn the communists that such tactics would not be permitted. On 24 February 1950, he summoned communist Diet member SUNAMA Ichiro, who was guilty of a particularly vicious attack and through him warned the Communist Party in the following words:

"I have summoned you to give you warning, and through you to warn your associates in the Communist Party that lying statements concerning the Occupation will not be tolerated. Your statement was in direct violation of a long standing Occupation directive with which you and your fellow party members are fully familiar. Its obvious purpose is to use the legislative forum as an instrument of propaganda directed against the Occupation. The AKAHATA, newspaper of the Communist Party, likewise is moving steadily toward that line beyond which it cannot go without similarly violating the Occupation directive.

"You, your leaders, and hundreds of your fellows were released from prison where you had long been incarcerated by the Civil Liberties Directive issued by the Supreme Commander immediately following the surrender. Since then, the Supreme Commander has fed you, clothed you and your families and protected your right to organize as a lawful political party in Japan. He has literally saved Japan from the brink of impending disaster. Have you no intelligence or gratitude? How do you justify that recently a tendency has been noted on the part of you and some of your associates to avail yourselves of your liberty in licentious disregard of the very purposes for which protection in the exercise of liberty is extended by the Supreme Commander?

"My purpose is to warn you and through you the members of your party that any further statements of this kind, either on the floor of the Diet, in your newspapers, or any place in Japan, defaming and criticizing the Occupation will be cause for your immediate arrest. If your newspapers transgress the bounds of free expression which have been established by the Occupation, they will be closed, and if misconduct by its members or party policy dictated by its leaders is such that the Communist Party under reasonable interpretation becomes a threat to the legitimate political purposes of a free society, the protection of the Supreme Commander will be withdrawn.

"Inform your fellows that by their conduct, or their misconduct, they themselves will prescribe the duration of their party as a political influence in Japan.

"There exists today peace and tranquility in Japan. This responds to the fact that the great majority of the Japanese people are peacefully inclined, law-abiding citizens. The Supreme Commander will not permit any group in Japan, whatever its name or political affiliation, to incite violence and disrespect for Occupation directives or Japanese law. As long as the Occupation lasts, he will exact obedience to his orders and respect for the processes of representative government in all political activity. Be yourself warned and caution your fellows."

This warning for a time was heeded but party fanatics were under pressure from International Communism and could not be quieted. On 7 June 1950, General MacArthur found it necessary to direct the Japanese Government in the following letter to purge the responsible editorial staff of the AKAHATA:

"To the end that representative democracy in Japan might have the opportunity to thrive in the free atmosphere of full knowledge and public discussion, it has been one of the most fundamental of Allied policies governing the Occupation to encourage and assist the development of a truly free and responsible press. In the furtherance of this purpose, censorship was progressively lifted until finally terminated two years ago and the press left free to publish on its own responsibility, subject only to a code embodying a statement of principles and ethics patterned after the Canons of Journalism of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, supplemented by minimum restrictions essential to the safeguard of military security.

"The Japanese press has in general responded admirably to this challenge and developed a degree of responsibility which has evoked most favorable comment from many visiting journalists from abroad. The glaring exception is the Communist organ AKAHATA. This journal has for some time assumed the role of mouthpiece for the most violent of lawless elements within the Communist Party and as such has defiled its news columns and editorial page with licentious, false, inflammatory and seditious appeal to irresponsible sentiment in the effort to provoke defiance of constituted authority, disrupt the progress of economic revival and create social unrest and mass violence. All this calls for prompt corrective action to safeguard the public peace.

"One course such corrective action might take would be to close the journal and destroy for all time its propaganda making power and constant incitation to violence and revolution; another

the re-institution of pre-censorship over all material it proposes to print. Both courses, however, are repugnant to me as violative of the broad philosophy which has guided the development of press freedom in Japan and should be imposed only if other measures prove ineffective.

"As an alternative method of correction, I therefore direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to incorporate within my letter to you of 6 June 1950 the following named additional persons, sharing responsibility for the policies governing the content of this journal:

"AIKAWA Haruki	MORIYA Tenro	SUGAMA Shosaku
ANEBA Saburo	NISHIZAWA Tomio	TAKAHASHI Katsuyuki
AOYAMA Toshio	OKAMOTO Tadashi	TAKEI Takeo
KAWAMURA Tatsuo	SAKANO Yoshiro	TAKEMOTO Kenzo
KIKUNAMI Katsumi	SHIMADA Koichi	UCHINO Soji
MIYAMOTO Taro	SUITA Hidezo	

SHIGA Yoshio, dominant influence of AKAHATA, was named in SCAP's letter of 6 June 1950 to be designated purgee as a member of the Central Committee.

Suspension of Communist Publications

This warning was not sufficient; scurrilous material continued to be published and on 26 June 1950, SCAP gave final warning by directing suspension of the publication of AKAHATA for a period of 30 days. He said:

"In my letter to you of June 7th, I directed that certain persons therein listed as sharing responsibility for the editorial policies of the communist organ AKAHATA be, for the reasons stated, rendered subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946 and their implementing ordinances. I took this action in the hope that through the new leadership thereby induced the paper might be reoriented toward a course of relative moderation, with due regard for the truth and avoidance of inflammatory appeals to lawlessness and violence. Examination of the paper during the period intervening discloses, however, that such hope has not materialized.

"In its latest issues, moreover, by its perversion of the truth in discussing the Korean situation, the paper gives evidence of the fact that it is not the legitimate organ of a Japanese political party but rather an instrument of foreign subversion used to disseminate among the people of Japan, and in this case particularly its large Korean minority, malicious, false and inflammatory propaganda aimed at subverting the public mind to the prejudice of the public peace and welfare. Seditious acts of this

nature may not be tolerated in a peaceful and democratic society.

"Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary measures to cause publication of AKAHATA to be suspended for a period of thirty days, after which its right to continued existence will depend upon its ability to attain a position of responsibility within the ranks of Japan's free and responsible press."

The Communist Party was in a vise and ideological pressure from the Cominform was great; attempts were made to thwart SCAP's purpose by setting up successors to AKAHATA. Therefore, SCAP directed the Japanese Government to suppress all communist newspapers and all offending communist publications of whatsoever nature. Schedule of suspension of the communist organs was as follows:

Publications	Beginning Date	Affected Number
AKAHATA	27 June 50	1
Regional, Prefectural and Certain Ward Committee Organs (Tokyo)	28 June 50	110
District Committees and Large Cell Organs	11 July 50	655
Cell Organs and others	30 July 50	932
Total as of 1 May 51		1,698

Normal public information media channels have thus been denied the Communist Party. Though sporadic propaganda activity is continued through variously circulated organs, the party is now unable adequately either to instruct its members or propagandize sympathizers—and has lost a considerable source of income.

Party workers have frantically endeavored to continue some sort of nationally circulated organ whatever the cost. Papers of front controlled groups have served for this purpose as have clandestinely published smear sheets. The Japanese Government has however vigorously traced each successive publication to its source and there arrested the editorial staff and blocked and seized presses and other equipment to the considerable distress of the party. Until 23 January 1951 when a list of responsible distributors was discovered, government authority could not break up the distribution net. Acting on this list officers properly equipped with search warrants descended upon 378 distribution points throughout all Japan in the early morning of 4 February 1951 and arrested 568 communists for this illegal activity.

Major AKAHATA Successors	Date Suspended
SHIN BUNKA (New Culture)	24 July 1950
RODŌ SHIMBUN (Labor Newspaper)	24 July 1950
KAIHO SHIMBUN (Liberation Newspaper)	2 Aug. 1950
KAKYO MIMPO (Huachiao Daily)	28 Sept. 1950
JIYU SHIMBUN (Liberty Newspaper)	10 Nov. 1950
HEIWA NO TOMO (Friends of Peace)	21 Dec. 1950
HEIWA NO KOE (Voice of Peace)	23 Jan. 1951

XI. LABOR ACTIVITIES

During World War II and ten years before, Japan's militarists and ultranationalists had exterminated all semblance of healthy labor leadership in Japan by harsh legislation and police state methods. Labor freed to organize under Allied policy (summarized in the Sixteen Point Declaration of Principles for Japanese Trade Unions) had no experienced leadership, no organization technicians and no tradition for legal, orderly struggle in the pattern developed by trial and error in the labor unions of the western democracies. Here the communists saw an opportunity and seized it. For a time, they made progress in securing control of newly formed, rapidly growing but immature workers' organizations by infiltrating experienced party workers into key positions. But here again, the communists had no real understanding of the opportunity. Though they could, by orderly, sincere leadership have forged sound and lasting support in the unions—which they once controlled—they chose to use their power to further political ends, and thus lost their influence to more moderate, less self-interested elements.

Seizure of Leadership

Communist minorities dominated all government workers' unions, railroad unions, most heavy industry unions, the maritime unions, the communications unions, the teachers' unions, and the unions in the electrical industry. They were in absolute control of labor forces with tremendous support in the occupation, the Japanese public, and in organized labor throughout the world. They were able to guide the course of Japanese labor until their mistakes brought labor movements into disrepute and lost that store of good will.

As early as 7 April 1946, the Communist Party openly indicated that it would use the strength of labor for political purpose. Party spokesman NOZAKA said, "To overthrow the reactionary anti-peoples' Cabinet of Shidehara, mere demonstrations and meetings will not avail. We should prepare a general strike of all laborers and other workers throughout the country."

The Communist Party's fumbling of the control of labor can be divided roughly into four phases: Production control; the general strike effort; the public servants' struggle; and the localized struggle.

Production Control

The production control strike, a device conceived in Italy, is very effective when government mechanisms are uncertain in action. Immediate postwar Japan was an ideal field for such techniques, which were first used in the Yomiuri Press Strike, 24 October 1945, and the Keisei Dentetsu Strike of 1 December 1945. It appeared that the com-

munist leaders of Japan labor could gain control over any industry by this method.

To perfect the application of the production strike technique, the Communist Party decided to concentrate on single industry organization. Recognizing that control of public information media meant virtual control of public thinking under the existing chaotic conditions, the party concentrated first on organization of newspaper and communications workers' unions. Their gains were impressive here and in other industry-wide unions. On 10 March 1946 they set up a National Labor Unions' Liaison Council. May Day 1946, the Council directed a demonstration in which more than two million workers throughout Japan participated.

Political party purpose rather than the welfare of the worker was apparent. Demonstrations were directed at national and local government offices in show of force to intimidate officials and soften their resistance to the demands of the Communist Party. SCAP pointed out the dangers of the situation. Thereafter the Japanese Government, on 13 June 1946, prohibited the Production Control Strike. The Japanese worker, glad of sane guidance, responded admirably and the first crisis was past.

General Strike Efforts

Perhaps it was in anticipation of the prohibition of "Production Control" that NOZAKA in April called for a general strike. Organization to this end had proceeded with the tentative target date for a "fall offensive" publicly announced. In the meantime, the party tested its strength by calling strikes in various key industries and public service organs, including the Yomiuri Press, 12 July 1946, the maritime unions, 10 September 1946, and the railroad unions early in September. Public support, essential to a general strike, did not appear and many laborers resisted. The target date was therefore retarded and the railroad strike suspended. Further organizational propaganda, and infiltration activities were planned, and an attempt was made to effect awareness of the laborer's needs by an electrical union strike technique of shutting off the power supply to certain users in accordance with preannounced schedules.

Living conditions continued difficult for the average Japanese. That apathy which had accompanied the shock of the surrender was wearing off, and there was dissatisfaction with measures taken by the existing government to alleviate hardship. On 6 January 1947, the communist leaders felt time was ripe to announce they would call out the workers on a general strike in February. In final preparation, a communist-dominated Joint Struggle Committee boasting the control of four million organized workers was set up. The Japanese public and the Japanese worker did not give all-out support to the general strike plans, but neither did they know how to oppose them. Their dissatisfaction with uncertain

internal guidance was such that they looked to General MacArthur for a decision, which he gave them firmly and without compromise.

On 31 January 1947, General MacArthur issued the following public statement, which took the form of an instruction from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to the General Strike Organizers:

"....I have informed the labor leaders whose unions have federated for the purpose of conducting a general strike that I will not permit the use of so deadly a social weapon in the present impoverished and emaciated condition of Japan, and have accordingly directed them to desist from the furtherance of such action.

.....

"A general strike crippling transportation and communication would prevent the movement of food to feed the people and of coal to sustain essential utilities, and would stop such industry as is still functioning. The paralysis which inevitably would result might reduce large masses of the Japanese people to the point of actual starvation and would produce dreadful consequences upon every Japanese home regardless of social strata or direct interest in the basic issue....

.....

"While I have taken this measure as one of dire emergency, I do not intend otherwise to restrict the freedom of action heretofore given to labor in the achievement of legitimate objectives. Nor do I intend in any way to compromise or influence the basic social issues involved. These are matters of evolution which time and circumstances may well orient without disaster as Japan gradually emerges from its present distress."

By this action the situation was composed. Press and public opinion unanimously supported the Supreme Commander's intervention and condemned the instigators of the averted general strike as enemies of the public welfare.

Public Servants' Struggle

Control of Japanese labor unions by communist elements continued to present a serious problem. The unions they dominated included employees of the Japanese Government engaged in the operation of government-owned railway and communication systems and in governmental administrative activities. Virtual control of internal transportation and communications gave these groups influence over the Japanese Government and pressure on the public out of all proportion to real strength, and the communists prepared to exert this power, not to the advancement of the economic and social betterment of the workers, but to the political ends of the subversive elements in control.

The problem was attacked along a broad front. Research was instituted to determine and prepare legislation providing adequate guarantees to the worker, and at the same time, prohibiting strikes against the people—in accordance with the well recognized democratic principle that the public servant cannot be permitted to force his minority demands upon the majority, whose will is spoken through elected representatives.

The communist leaders of the unions which included public servants were aware that unless they acted soon the chance to disrupt governmental process by strike of the government workers would be gone.

On 1 March 1948, they called a series of rallies calculated to unite all workers in a common front opposing regulation of the public servant. At the same time, they called for a communication workers' strike. Had GHQ not intervened forbidding "coordinated work stoppages," the country's mail, telephone communications would have been hopelessly disrupted in early April with inevitable unfavorable impact upon economic recovery and the welfare of all Japanese. On 17 May 1948, they endeavored to incite government railway employees to strike by calling out 30,000 private railway workers, but control of the government railway workers' unions was shifting away from them and they were unsuccessful.

These tactics aroused such apprehension among political leaders and appeared to have such strong support from other labor organizations, including electrical workers, metal workers and mine workers, that the Japanese Government considered it impossible without SCAP support to secure legislation necessary to the control of the peoples' servants. SCAP therefore, on 22 July, directed the Japanese Government that legislation be enacted prohibiting strikes or similar labor tactics by government employees. He further directed that (pending passage by the Diet of adequate legislation) measures immediately be taken under Potsdam authority to effect this order.

The Japanese Government responded on 31 July 1948 by issuing Cabinet Order No. 201 embodying temporary rules for the control of governmental workers. This Cabinet Order remained controlling over national government employees' activities until the National Public Service Law was promulgated on 3 December 1948 and will continue controlling on local government servants until the promulgation of a local government service law.

Despite desperate tactics of the communists (including incitement of an illegal railway strike in Hokkaido in August, outcries that any restriction of labor's right to strike was contrary to the Potsdam Declaration, and a September request to the Russian Mission for intercession) SCAP's action staving off anarchy at once received general support from the Japanese public at large. Later it was approved by responsible world labor organizations if not by the affected workers themselves.

Thereafter, though various unions including government workers

among membership threatened strikes, none seriously challenged SCAP's order. Disorderly elements of the Government Railway Workers' Union made the most determined effort. In June of 1949 an unruly minority, since punished by court action, stopped a number of local trains, and in one instance, known as the "People's Electric Car Case" ran an unauthorized train.

Feeling was high among the railway workers; a number of them were soon to be discharged in an effort to bring operation of the railroads out of the red and they were gaining the support of the Communication Workers' Union, whose members faced similar personnel reductions. On 5 July, however, there was immediate public revulsion to union extremists who were blamed for the murder of SHIMOYAMA, National Railroad Corporation President, whose mutilated body was found on the railroad track north of Tokyo. Even the most militant union leaders realized further disruptive action would be dealt with by an aroused citizenry.

Localized Struggles

The Communist Party therefore retreated from support of the public servant and in accordance with its policy of "two steps forward and one back" began to create local labor trouble wherever possible, adopting the so-called "one man, one demand" tactic. Efforts concentrated principally among electric workers, heavy industry employees, maritime workers, and miners impeded economic recovery. But not again was the Communist Party able to threaten domination of Japan through control of the labor movement. When on 26 September 1949 at the Seventeenth Emergency Central Committee, the party analyzed the labor front for the benefit of organizers, advising on probabilities and principles, practical admission was made that control of organized labor in Japan was in the hands of non-communist labor leaders.

Loss of Labor Control

Last of the great unions controlled by the communists, the Electrical Workers, was lost to them when its convention in July 1950 expelled the communist faction. Neither has the once powerful union control organ, the World Federation of Trade Unions dominated National Congress of Industrial Workers maintained its usefulness. Lately it is being considered for voluntary dissolution which is graphic testimony of the bankruptcy of the communist labor program, typified by this paragraph of the agenda for the next party convention:

"The party is considering to put into force the dissolution of the National Congress of Industrial Organizations at the National Convention of the party [to be held in November, 1950] in order to infiltrate the party influence into labor unions by setting up another organization."

XII. LABOR RATIONALIZATION AFFECTING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Necessity for Rationalization

Communist minorities early infiltrated unions including public servants among their membership, organizations of public information media employees, and the important industrial and utility unions. So firmly entrenched were they in union policy-making that they could turn the power of labor to communist ends. Labor as organized in Japan included supervisory employees in the same unions with their subordinates. Neither did Japanese labor leadership possess the protective inhibitions developed over the years in the western democracies. Authoritative intervention, therefore, was essential to rationalize the influence of the communist minority.

Tax Collectors' Union Incident

In late 1947 and the first months of 1948, the Communist Party organized an intensive tax struggle to appeal to small and medium enterprisers. Communist committees were organized in various neighborhoods to coordinate tax protests. Cases mediated in the tax collectors' offices by these committees were usually productive of tax adjustments.

Communist propaganda advertised this preferential service. Investigations disclosed the explanation that control of the All-Japan Tax Collectors' Union was in the hands of the Communist Party and tax officials were favoring communist sponsored tax protests.

Finance Minister, IKEDA Hayato, broke the back of this conspiracy by moving with decision to discharge tax officials misusing public positions in the interest of the Communist Party. These discharges which took place in the spring of 1948 were for legally justifiable disciplinary reasons. They were significant as the first moves of any Japanese to combat illegal communist manipulation of unionized workers by release of communist agitators from the employment which made them eligible for official participation in local union affairs.

Government Personnel Adjustments

Job holders are protected in Japan by rights of tenure, labor standards laws, and other progressive labor legislation. The communists could not be separated from employment, including governmental employment, without cause. Therefore, despite the evident benefits to Japanese political and economic stability of the action taken by the Finance Minister regarding communist-motivated tax officials, it was not until July 1949

that other government agencies were enabled to relieve employee unions of irresponsible leadership.

When the Nine-Point Economic Stabilization Program made government retrenchment necessary, personnel appropriations were decreased to the extent that thousands of non-essential governmental employees had to be discharged. The Prime Minister decided that such discharges should be on the basis of ridding the government of its least efficient workers. Communists in the government offices and enterprises had almost invariably devoted their principal attention to labor agitation to the neglect of their assigned duties. It was, therefore, legally possible under the Administrative Agency Fixed Personnel Law and the National Public Service Law to separate these employees. When Cabinet Conference determined that such action was politically feasible as well, it was carried out routinely with the results indicated in the following table:

COMMUNISTS DISCHARGED FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICES

Government Office	Em- ployees	Dis- missed	Per- cent	Dates Of Action
Attorney General's Office ..	30,856	73	0.23	Jul 49—Feb 50
Board of Audit	1,247	8	0.63	Aug 49
Ministry of Agriculture And Forestry	30 986	237	0.76	Aug 49—Oct 50
Ministry of Construction ...	10,866	71	0.65	Aug 49
Ministry of Education	1,764	20	1.12	Sep 49
Schools (under Ministry of Education)	61,847	167	0.27	
Ministry of Finance	13,373	380	2.84	Jul 49—Aug 50
MITI	13,533	101	0.74	Aug —Oct 49
Ministry of Labor	20 795	76	0.36	End Of Sep 49
Ministry of Postal Admin. .	260,640	1,664	0.63	End Of Sep 49
Ministry of Telecom- munication	144 642	1,077	0.74	End Of Sep 49
Ministry of Transportation .	16,068	612	3.81	End Of Sep 49
Ministry of Welfare	44 073	183	0.41	Aug —Nov 49
Prime Minister's Office	2,269	8	0.35	Aug 49
Autonomous Police	95 000	170	—	Aug 49—Oct 50
Courts	19,536	16	0.01	Jul —Sep 49
Local Public Entities	248,320	1,650	0.66	Oct 49—Feb 50
NPA	1,262	6	0.47	Sep 49
National Railroads	482,837	2,591	0.53	Jul —Aug 49
NRP	46,036	96	0.20	Aug —Sep 49
Price Control	330	3	0.90	Sep 49
Public Schools	572,864	1,583	0.30	Dec 49—Oct 50
Special Procurement Board .	6,825	1	0.01	Sep 49
Totals	2,125,879	10,793		

As a result of this action, communist control of the public servants was lost and that basic domestic tranquility upon which the new democracy of Japan strengthens was enhanced. Gradually, however, additional

communists infiltrated the ranks of the public servants and to interfere with the administration of public business; therefore, the Government in connection with further personnel adjustment scheduled the discharge during the latter part of 1950 of about 1,100 known troublemakers. These communists were given the opportunity to correct their errors. None was listed for release who had not committed overt illegal act.

The Ministry of Education is discussing the rescreening of school teachers in order to discover and remove communists and their fellows from the field of education. The Ministry, as yet, has found no effectual plan by which such action can be accomplished. Until the administration of the various schools is strengthened and taught to take a properly responsible attitude it must be presumed that there will be no positive solution to illegal teacher activity.

Information Media Personnel Adjustments

Communists in public information organs slanted the news through control of various sensitive positions. Recognizing this evil, the heads of the great information media companies of Japan met in Tokyo to determine proper response to SCAP's letter of 18 July 1950 in which he said:

"...In the great struggle which is now engaging the forces of the free world all segments must accept and faithfully fulfill their share of the attendant responsibility. That share as to none is greater than such as falls upon the media of public information. For there rests the full responsibility of insuring dissemination of the truth, and based upon the truth the development of an informed and enlightened public opinion. History records no instance where a free press failed in the discharge of this responsibility without inviting its own doom...."

At this meeting, information media organ executives decided to act independently and on their own responsibility to sever from employment all communists and their fellow travelers who worked to thwart accurate presentation of the news. Following is a list of subsequent action:

Public Information Media	Number Dismissed As of 24 October 1950	Date (1950)
Broadcasting Facilities	121	Jul - Aug
News Agencies (2)	50	Jul - Aug
Newspaper Companies (46)	519	Jul - Aug
Total	690	

Decision of Fukuoka District Court

Those discharged moved immediately to protest in court actions. The courts received the cases and heard them. The first decision announced (a pattern for subsequent decisions) was that of the Fukuoka District Court in the case of certain dismissed persons vs the Western

Office of the ASAHI SHIMBUN, handed down 9 September 1950. The appellants protested that the action of the ASAHI in dismissing communists was unconstitutional and in violation of the Labor Standards Law. The judgment of the court was:

"The people in general have already deemed that there is a danger that the Communist Party may proceed to organized activity with the objective of violent revolution. This fact is also known from General MacArthur's letters and messages. If these activities are unchecked a state of disturbance and anarchy and rule by force will be brought about; fundamental human rights will be trampled, and the Constitution become as a sheet of waste paper. The aim of democracy under the new Constitution is emancipation of the individual from feudal and totalitarian oppressions and his utmost protection to enjoy fundamental rights and liberties. The objective of the Japan Communist Party is the bondage of class dictatorial power. The party's method of realization of this objective is disturbance of order and domination by violence. The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, speech and association but it does not guarantee against frustration of these freedoms by subversive activity. Further, the guarantee of fundamental rights by the Constitution does not give the right—even in order to realize a certain ideal—to ignore the basic human rights of others. . . . Rights and liberties which our Constitution intends to guarantee have their own limits in the public welfare. . . . Each individual is a unit in social life of the community and it cannot be considered proper exercise of right and freedom to abuse the exercise of guaranteed liberties beyond the limits which are inherent in these liberties.

"To be a member of the Japan Communist Party or a fellow sympathizer thereof is not only to be true to the creed of communism but to take action at any time, in obedience to the party's directives, as a member of a defiant organization which with destructive motive attacks the Constitution and all other laws and ordinances. Therefore, it is not contrary to the Constitution that a private organization producing an important publication eliminated members of the Japan Communist Party or its sympathizers in order to protect the press from the danger as mentioned above; such action was a necessary measure of protection against the threat of disturbance and destruction of the strong organization of the Japan Communist Party—not a discrimination against the profession of creed."

Rationalization in Industries and Utilities

Industry and utilities also felt the need to free their employee organiza-

tions of communist influence. Encouraged by the action of the public information media companies as upheld by the decision of the Fukuoka District Court, and by the statement of the Japanese Government that it intended further action to sever governmental employees active in support of communism, companies in these fields began a program of release of communists in sensitive positions in the autumn of 1950.

A tabulation of those discharged and scheduled to be discharged follows:

Industries	No. Employed	No. Dismissed	Percentage
Banking Firms	111,700	27	.02
Chemical Industry	170,000	1,432	.84
Coal Mining	395,000	1,924	.48
Express Companies	110,000	516	.46
Electrical Industry	204,000	2,137	1.04
Heavy Industry (iron & steel)*	190,000	2,164	1.13
Life Insurance Industry	12,300	10	.08
Mining (other than coal)	70,000	219	.31
Motion Picture Companies	8,000	122	1.52
Oil Industry	105,000	91	.08
Printing Industry	12,000	160	1.33
Private Railway	134,000	519	.38
Pulp Industry	30,000	110	.36
Spinning & Textile Industry	200,000	83	.04

* Includes automobile manufacturing & shipbuilding companies.

The program of labor rationalization undertaken independently by Japanese agencies concerned has undoubtedly drawn moral support from SCAP and encouragement from the warm response of Japanese public opinion. It has turned the practical control of Japanese unions to labor leaders whose primary interest is betterment of the laborers' lot. Though it has militated against the livelihood of 22,000 people, it has enabled millions more to maintain their employment under steadily bettering conditions. The dismissals have not been predicated solely on ideological belief or party affiliation, but have been made after analysis of misconduct and on the job risk: neglect of duty, obstruction of business, betrayal of official information, tendency to sabotage, and acts prejudicial to the integrity of government and public welfare. Those affected are protected by sound labor procedures including appeal to the courts. Unless ill-advised management abuses the rationalization program to offend honest labor leadership, Japan's labor management relationships will continue vastly improved.

XIII. PARTY FINANCES

The Japan Communist Party is not financially self-sustaining. In the past it has depended upon grants of funds from more prosperous organs of the Comintern, donations variously secured, and activities not quite within the law.

Dues of loyal members constitute the greatest source of income to the present Japan Communist Party. Members are expected to give within their means, and in any event, to pay into the party treasury at least one per cent of earnings, however small. The heaviest expense is for personnel since the Communist Party, depending upon the all-out efforts of its leaders and organizers, must maintain them and their families.

Even when most prosperous the Japan Communist Party never has quite enough money and, generally, it has far from enough.

Pre-war Financing

In the period from organization of the first Communist Party in Japan until 1943, the party is believed to have been financed largely by donations from the Russian, Chinese and American communist parties. Police records indicate that when KONDO Eizo returned from Shanghai in May 1921, he brought 6,500 yen with him for the party funds. There are other such instances. WATANABE Masanosuke was bringing funds from China for the party when fearing capture by the police, he committed suicide. Some additional funds came from the party's publication enterprises, such as the Hope Pavilion, the Marx Bookstore, and the White Willow House, and from contributions made by culture groups. No great sums were needed since the party was small and its program not ambitious.

Party revenue for 1933 was recorded by police investigators as approximately the following:

Estimated Revenue for 1933	
Party fees (500 CP members)	¥ 12,000
All Japan Workers' Union	30,000
Japan Proletariat Cultural League	30,000
College Students and Teachers	36,000
Individuals	30,000
Illegally acquired (DAIHYAKU Bank Robbery)	31,800
Total	¥169,800

Postwar Financial Difficulties

When the Japan Communist Party became active in 1945, first expenses were met by contributions from unidentified agencies of International Communism.

There were also considerable contributions to fund-gathering campaigns conducted on the streets and at mass rallies. This spring of general public financial support quickly dried up as the party's shining promises tarnished and it therefore became necessary to organize a special financial section. KUROKI Shigenori had the job for a short time in the spring of 1946 until succeeded by KAMEYAMA Kozo.

KAMEYAMA continued as the party's ablest finance expert. Under his guidance a financial accounting section endeavored to keep party finances on a business basis. Despite his efforts, however, demands upon the exchequer have invariably exceeded receipts.

A crisis was reached in September 1949 when the party over-extended financially as a result of optimistic estimates of the effects of the January 1949 election results and communist successes in China. KAMEYAMA then pointed out that the party was paying salaries to 7,000 organizers and subsidizing more than 20 propaganda and educational agencies. He warned that party income could not stand the strain and that the Japan Communist Party was on the verge of bankruptcy. He stated that almost half of the party members were not paying their dues and that prospering members such as authors NAKANO Shigeji and NISHIZAWA Ryuji were firmly opposing the program of levies on the basis of ability to pay.

KAMEYAMA's diatribe was not well received. He had detractors (including at that time AKAHATA's Chief, SHIGA Yoshio, who objected to his efforts to bring the paper's revenues into the common party accounts) and he was therefore replaced by YOSHIZUMI Kiyoshi. YOSHIZUMI had been working with NOZAKA in furtherance of Sino-Japanese trade talks with businessmen, but he was not recommended by any particular financial ability. The financial support NOZAKA had promised from businessmen interested in trade with communist China failed to materialize. In October salaries of party workers could not be paid.

KAMEYAMA's Reforms

The party called KAMEYAMA back in November to institute the reform he demanded including control of AKAHATA accounts by the Financial Section, reduction in the number of salaried party organizers and officials, and rationalization of subsidies to party schools, propaganda agencies and enterprises. No action in liquidation of personal debts of party leaders was to be taken even when those debts were to banks for sums passed directly to the party.

KAMEYAMA's reforms could not resolve the crisis but they alleviated it, and by mid-1950 party workers were receiving their pay with acceptable regularity. KAMEYAMA, however, issued a warning that there was no ground for optimism. He stated in a "White Paper" presented to the Central Guidance Section that the party's budget for the fiscal year had been predicated upon income of ¥226,000,000 more than it could collect

and that the spending of ¥65,000,000 more than originally budgeted had been proposed. He stated that the party was dependent upon the dues of members for 60 per cent of its income and that dues collections were in arrears. He presented the following table to point decreasing revenue from this source, adding that dues were normally expected from twofold the number of those listed as regular members:

Year	Regular Members	Membership Fees
1946	8,132	¥ 2,650
1947	16,947	¥ 3,762,871
1948	37,612	¥ 62,853,470
1949	93,935	¥150,296,300
1950	75,832	

His paper included information that, though the party had expected ¥50,000,000 in contributions in 1949, only ¥30,000,000 came in; and that, of ¥30,000,000 estimated from this source in 1950, not one half could be collected.

Party Enterprises and Holdings

Party enterprises have been re-examined since KAMEYAMA's statement and the following are no longer subsidized:

- Theatre Puppet Group
- Advance Theatrical Troupe
- Yoyogi Bookstore
- Hikari Technical Works
- Soviet Repatriation Livelihood Protection League
- Democratic Paper—Player Group
- League of Okinawans

Subsidies are continued however to the Communist Party School, the Marx-Lenin Research Institute, the Sanichi School, and the Yoyogi Health Clinic.

The party organ, AKAHATA, and its affiliates were most profitable of the enterprises. Their gross was ¥55,000,000 in 1949-50, and despite wasteful business methods they turned ¥4,000,000 into the party treasury. This income is lost as the result of the paper's excesses which necessitated its suspension by SCAP in mid-1950.

Profitable party enterprises are:

- Central Bookstore Company, Limited
- Shimbashi Bookstore
- Domestic and Foreign Construction Company, Limited
- Campa Merchandise Company
- Yoyogi Club
- Bunka (Cultural) Confectionary

The party's real property, held in the names of KAMEYAMA, NOZAKA and other party leaders is principally in the Yoyogi District of Tokyo. It totals about ¥10,000,000 in book value, but is heavily mortgaged. It consists of 1,400 tsubo of land and 25 buildings, mostly of frame structure, aggregating 1,000 tsubo.

Recognizable party bank accounts on 1 October 1950 were:

Bank	Depositor	Amount of Deposit
OSAKA Bank	Individuals	¥1,112,371.95
TEIKOKU Bank	Individuals	102,085.34
FUJI Bank	Party	113.97
	Individuals	36,333.59
KYOWA Bank	Individuals	16.00
Grand Total		¥1,250,920.85

Illegal Fund Raising Activity

In the past, the party has turned to International Communism and to illegal pursuits when in desperate financial straits. Thus far there are only two provable instances of illegal fund raising activity: One involves santonin valued at ¥700,000 unlawfully imported in 1949 by Tottori communists; the second, heroin valued at ¥1,800,000 seized by police from Kyushu communists in September 1950.

Concerning present contributions from International Communism there is no definite information. Certainly, however, the party's expenses continue far in excess of apparent income.

XIV. PARTICIPATION IN MASS VIOLENCE

As expounded by International Communism's lesser prophets, Marx-Leninism demands that the communist employ every means to disrupt society in prelude to revolution. Legal or illegal method alike is acceptable. Local circumstance and the inclination of native leaders are only factors in determining party tactics.

Communist efforts to disrupt Japanese society by general strike, control of government workers' unions, legal political maneuvers, and those other measures a communist party uses to temper its workers and bring an awareness of party presence to the people have not been successful in Japan. Neither has mass violence been of any avail, though the postwar party has probed the efficiency of this tactic.

1946 Incidents

At the Itabashi Japanese Government Supply Depot on 21 January 1946, IWATA Kiichi organized and led 2,000 of Tokyo's hungry to raid and seizure by force of certain foodstuff within the depot.

TOKUDA, NOZAKA, KASUGA Shoichi and ITO Kenichi forced their way into the Prime Minister's official residence at the head of a mob on 7 April 1946. Gates, doors and windows were broken. Prime Minister SHIDEHARA Kijuro was frightened and the Occupation Forces were alerted to prevent repetition of such incident. On 12 May 1948, IWATA and TOKUDA tried the feelings of the people on the Emperor System, exhorting a mob in the Imperial Plaza that the Imperial family was living in luxury while the people starved. They found supporters and, leading them, pressed past guards to the palace environs.

General MacArthur thereafter, on 20 May 1946, called upon the Japanese people to cease such lawless action.

There was no further notable instance of communist-instigated public violence until 1949. Then, at Fukuoka during the first ten days of May, communists led a protest against the discharge of unreliable Fukuoka Western Railway Company employees and public disturbances occurred including seizure by a mob of the railroad company's offices.

A month later the Japan Steel Company at Hiroshima announced discharge of 600 employees. Local communist organizations supported the disgruntled workers and instigated forceable action of such unruly character that police intervention was required.

Taira and Associated Cases

In Taira (Fukushima Prefecture), on 30 June 1949, after police ordered removal of a communist signboard which interfered with traffic, the communists and leftist Koreans seized the police station, hoisted a red flag, and for four hours refused eviction. Simultaneously, communist-

led mobs engaged in disorderly demonstration at the Fukushima Assembly, the Koriyama (Fukushima Prefecture) Police Station and the Hirota Iron Works of the Tokyo Steel Company Limited. Japanese reaction was a mixture of fear and revulsion and party prestige suffered nation-wide.

Korean League

Communists among the Koreans perpetrated many acts of violence generally directed against non-communist Koreans. The communist-dominated League of Koreans in Japan planned to destroy the more moderate Korean Republic Association of Japan. On 31 July 1949, League members attacked during a ceremony at the Utsunomiya Branch of the Association, destroying property and injuring several people. On 15 August 1949, the League interfered with an Association-sponsored parade at Onoda City (Yamaguchi Prefecture) and in the ensuing brawl 43 persons were injured. Finally, on 20 August 1949, at three o'clock in the morning, the League sent a mob against the locality occupied by Association members in Shimonoseki (Yamaguchi Prefecture) to kill, burn and destroy. Thereafter, the League was dissolved as a terroristic organization. Its principal members were purged; its properties seized; and the position of the more moderate Association thereby strengthened.

Eells and Plaza Cases

The communists do not publicly instigate violent action against members of the Occupation. Only two notable instances have occurred. Early in May 1950, Dr. Eells, CI&E educator, was "booed" by communists in student groups at schools in Sendai and Sapporo. There was no violence and this incident took importance only from the publicity it received. During the course of a communist-sponsored rally in the Imperial Plaza, 30 May 1950, Occupation Force personnel were attacked by eight young communists when they intervened to quiet a disturbance involving members of the mob and a Japanese policeman. The rowdies received no encouragement or protection from the crowd and they were immediately identified and arrested by the Military Police and tried and sentenced by Occupation Court.

Mitaka Accusation

Even as communist leaders realize the party exists in Occupied Japan by sufferance and accordingly avoid public taint of violence, so do extremists in opposition to the Communist Party recognize this vulnerability and accuse the party of guilt in many disorders where complicity is not legally provable. Such was the Mitaka Railway Incident of 15 July 1949, when an individual communist sympathizer illegally moved a seven-car electric train and caused it to leave the track. Members of a communist cell were accused of plotting this tragic act which cost the lives of six innocent bystanders. No evidence, however, yet has been found to substantiate party connivance.

XV. CONCLUSION

Because General MacArthur's insight and leadership and American economic aid forestalled chaotic postwar upheaval in Japan, the Communist Party had no opportunity to seize control. Japan Communism's opportunity was to become a national party representing liberal labor and other left wing elements of society. Since, however, the party, as a segment of International Communism, must play its part in the scheme of world communization, local party leaders cannot achieve NOZAKA's ideal of the "lovable racial party."

Where Communism does not find chaos ready-made, it seeks to create it. To create chaos in the communistic pattern, three factors must be present: A disaffected peasantry and urban proletariat; a susceptible police or military agency sufficiently strong to control the people; and such insecurity that the majority disregarding familiar habit patterns demand drastic changes.

The seeds of these factors were present in Japan, but Occupation reforms halted their growth. Land reform made property holders of the former peasantry. Decentralization made it impossible to seize control of the people through control of security agencies. The Japanese people, intelligent, hardworking, cultured and by Asiatic comparison with high standards of livelihood and education have clung to the familiar.

Communism therefore cannot succeed in Japan except through economic conditions vastly worsened or by armed aggression. Communism will not be stamped out, however, and as NABEYAMA Sadachika has said, "No government operation can eliminate them and their illegal activity; only a counter-acting social force can defeat them."

The Japan Communist Party will strive to retain legal status. The party has large stakes in property held, public positions attained, and the will-o-the-wisp of common front with socialistic parties. To what unpardonable excesses subservience to International Communism may bring it cannot be predicted however.

The unenviable situation of the Japan Communist Party was succinctly summarized by General MacArthur in his statement on the Third Anniversary of the Japanese Constitution, 3 May 1950, as follows:

"Established in the immediate postwar era as a political party under constitutional protection and dedicated to the advance of certain political, economic and social theories, the Japan Communist Party proceeded initially in moderation and thereby enlisted some public support. In its endeavor to press this advan-

tage, however, it went the way of all Communist movements, becoming increasingly intemperate in political and social activity, and in due course aroused a popular revulsion which in turn relegated the party into virtual political eclipse. More latterly its shattered remnant, in frustration born of this failure, has cast off the mantle of pretended legitimacy and assumed instead the role of an avowed satellite of an international predatory force and a Japanese pawn of alien power policy, imperialistic purpose and subversive propaganda. ***Any thought that Japanese Communism might preserve a more moderate domestic course than characterizes the movement abroad was thoroughly disabused by its open submission to external control, its embarkation upon the spread of false, malicious and inflammatory propaganda intended to mislead and coerce the public mind, and its public adoption of objectives both anti-Japanese and inimical to Japan's public interest. ***The tragedy is that in every community it gains some converts among those citizens inherently law-abiding but mentally abnormal, frustrated, gullible or uninformed, and becomes because of this facade of respectability a seemingly responsible movement to which lawless elements may rally in order to fully exploit the vulnerable points inherent in democratic freedom. ***The issue is therefore clear and unequivocal. ***I have the utmost faith that should coming events presage the need for definitive action here to preserve the public welfare against the destructive potential of this form of insidious attack, the Japanese people will proceed with wisdom, serenity and justice, without failing the integrity of their Constitution."

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